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1. Executive Summary  
 
Moody’s Analytics provides valuable tools and services to investors and risk management 
professionals, helping them better understand and respond to an ever-changing financial 
environment, by offering credit analysis, advisory services, and financial risk management. A 
specific service that Moody’s provides for investors is a portal for a specific type of products, 
Structured Products, with several features and advantages further discussed in this report. 
The aim of this project is to help Moody’s offer a better and more comprehensive service to 
investors, particularly in the field of Structured Products, whose market still remains relatively 
unexplored. Our contribution, and thus this resulting project, can be divided into three main 
points.  
First, we started by becoming familiar with the Structured Finance Portal Moody’s, which is an 
efficient tool further described that Moody’s offers to investors. At this initial step, we had the 
opportunity to learn about its specificities, and produce a report analysing its strengths and 
weaknesses, in order to help Moody’s enhance the user experience by providing a more efficient 
Portal to its users. 
Secondly, we have helped Moody’s in understanding which metrics would be interesting for 
investors to have access to, and that could be made available on the portal. To achieve this, we 
have analysed thoroughly a set of metrics, assessing whether they are appropriate for structured 
products, and if they are valuable in terms of providing to investors accurate and relevant 
information on the products. The methodology and conclusions are described in this report; for 
this purpose, the metrics have been grouped into four categories: Input metrics, Spreads & 
Returns, Risk measures, and the Greeks. Summarizing, we found that some of the metrics, 
although very important and widely used in the financial world, were not relevant or properly 
applicable to this type of products. We consider from our broad analysis that the Option-
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Adjusted Spread (OAS), the Yield to Workout date, the yield to next call, the effective spread 
convexity, the effective spread to duration, the effective duration and the implied volatility are 
the most relevant and helpful when analysing complex products. These and the remaining 
metrics are described in this report in a hierarchical order by importance and relevance. 
Finally, we have produced a series of research documents on existing and in development 
regulations, with an emphasis on risk weight calculations for structured products, which is 
summarized in the final part of this report. This section of our project is also relevant, since 
regulatory requirements affect directly financial institutions, such as issuers (SPV), banks and 
insurance companies; consequently, these regulatory changes may affect indirectly investors, 
as the former may try to pass some of the incremental burden to its holders. By providing 
Moody’s with an overview of how risk weighting must be done to meet regulatory requirements, 
they can offer better advice to their clients on this matter, and incorporate this information to 














First appearing in the US market in 1987, structured products do not have a formal definition. 
However, some characteristics are generally present in this type of products. They are designed 
by modifying and combining traditional securities (such as stocks, bonds, indices), and can be 
structured to offer income, participation, growth, or a combination of these, linked to the 
performance of the underlying – consequently, being generally used as satellite investments, as 
specified by FT Adviser (2013a). Also, derivatives are usually bundled up with these assets to 
create a new product with specific features and payoffs. These can range from very 
sophisticated combinations to simpler versions of the primary securities, with the payoff 
structures also varying in complexity. 
Thus, this type of products can facilitate the customization of risk and return strategies 
according to the investors’ preferences and goals, whilst simplifying the process by allowing 
them to enter complex positions in options without having to access derivatives exchanges. 
Another advantage is the fact that investors can enter into positions not available on derivatives 
exchanges, such as positions with options with a longer than usual time to maturity and exotic 
options. They can also benefit banks because they can be used to transfer/share risk to/with 
investors (such as the case of residential mortgage back securities, as will be explained further 
on). 
Given the specificities and customizable particularities of structured products, they are 
generally traded OTC. They were originated in the US, where they grew immensely in issuance 
and trading in the 2000s and became one of the fastest growing financial services sector. By the 
mid-1990s they reached Europe, where they gained popularity in countries like Germany and 
Switzerland. Nevertheless, the market remains relatively unexplored (especially in terms of 
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regulation), so mispricing and opportunities to make superior returns commonly arise, as 
analyzed in later sections. 
Considering the advantages mentioned above, it is not surprising that structured products 
became quite popular, and that their market expanded considerably. Not only do these products 
allow single components (traditional assets) to be “packaged” in a tailored way, but they also 
enable investors with a low budget and knowledge to enter into derivatives positions without 
having to invest in them directly (Hens & Rieger, 2008).  Additionally, this type of securities 
could help achieve a certain level of diversification, balance and stability in a portfolio, since 
they supposedly offer defined outcomes based on defined market conditions, as stated by FT 
Adviser (2013b). 
In addition, their success can be partly attributed to the current market environment. For 
instance, it has been argued that changes in tax rules might be another reason for their 
attractiveness, since they can be used in a way that maximizes tax exemptions and allowances. 
For example, depending on the product, the returns can be classified as capital gains or income, 
thus being subject to different tax levels, as reported by FT Adviser (2013c)  
On the other hand, as interest rates dropped and remained at low levels in the 21st century, 
investors sought higher returns and incurred higher levels of leverage, encouraging risk transfer 
and dispersion (Blundell-Wignall, 2007). In fact, investors were attracted by the belief that they 
were safe investments, guaranteeing minimum payoffs. This narrative was based on two main 
points: the returns are commonly linked to an index, making structured products seem very 
safe, almost risk-free investments, like the assets they were associated with; and the fact that 
they generally had some kind of capital protection, which was sometimes misinterpreted as 
capital guaranteed (Deverell, 2011). 
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Nevertheless, structured products also raised some suspicion, being commonly blamed for the 
financial turmoil and crisis of 2008, because as the underlying mortgages of structured products 
such as MBS started defaulting, so did the products linked to them. While they had the 
advantage of allowing risk diversification by pooling several mortgages into one product, these 
were extremely vulnerable (and volatile), leading to considerable losses when they failed. 
Blundell-Wignall (2007) also mentions an important fact regarding the risk management: 
securitization has given incentives to the issuers of loans (or other underlying assets) to neglect 
due diligence on borrower quality, considering the repayment risk is no longer only supported 
by the issuer, but is to a certain extent transferred to the buyers of structured products.  
Furthermore, Hens and Rieger (2008) claim that in most cases, the utility gain for investors is 
merely an illusion, with most structured products not being optimal for rational investors. The 
authors believe the attractiveness of such products does not comes from rational decisions, but 
rather from behavioral reasons such as loss aversion and probability misestimation.  
2.1. Structured Products and their Market  
 
Many structured products are created through a process known as securitization. Asset 
securitization is a process through which a special purpose vehicle (SPV) creates securities and 
issues them to investors. Therefore, investors’ payments can be backed by the SPV’s cash flows 
originated from a pool of financial assets. Through this process, credit availability increases by 
transforming the illiquid assets of a lending entity into tradable securities, backed by assets.  
Banks developed the securitization to create value from the assets on their balance sheet. So 
financial institutions have the possibility of improving the liquidity of their balance sheet, 
because the original loan is substituted by a bond security with a possibility to be sold before 
maturity. The balance sheet is reduced by transferring part of its assets, thus the equity/asset 
ratio gets improved, which in turn allows it to release funds and reallocate them to more 
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profitable business. Therefore, they can refinance at an attractive cost, since Asset-Backed 
securities’ (ABS) interests are lower than the interests on the underlying loans (Martellini et al., 
2003).  
Moreover, this type of assets can be important to markets, as they make them more complete. 
For instance, when there is a gap in demand-supply, where demand exceeds the supply for debt 
products rated as AAA and B, this market necessity can be satisfied through the creation of a 
portfolio of debt products with an average classification of BBB and then issuing AAA and B 
tranches.  
Securitized products have advantages for both investors and borrowers, as good credit rating. 
However, there are several complexities associated with its products and market, such as the 
return and product life volatility, which have to be well measured when investing in this market. 
There are many different types of structured products available in the securitization market. 
Nevertheless, in this section we are going to focus on the ones that we had more contact with 
in the project for Moody’s Analytics: Asset-Backed securities, Mortgage-Backed securities, and 
Collateralized Debt Obligations. 
An Asset-Backed Security (ABS) is exclusively collateralized by a pool of underlying assets. 
The assets underlying an ABS can be either consumer financial assets (automobile loans, 
student loans and credit card receivables), or commercial financial assets (small business 
administration loans, agricultural machinery loans and trade receivables). When ABS are 
compared with corporate bonds, they have a highest claim on a pool of specific assets, so they 
are isolated from all other assets of the company, which gives them a secured status. 
ABS consist of several tranches with different ratings, which correspond to priority ranks in 
receiving cash flow payments from the trust in case of default. If the default losses are high and 
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the assets’ cash flow is not enough to pay all the liabilities, the Senior tranche (highest ranked) 
is paid first, followed by the lower-rated tranches by order of seniority. 
These securities are quoted in yield spread over the Treasury-bond yield curve or the swap yield 
curve, using the weighted average life (WAL) measure. 
A Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) is a type of ABS that is collateralized by a mortgage or 
pool of mortgages. The MBS can be of two types: Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities are 
backed by single-family residential properties; and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities 
are backed by commercial real estate, such as office buildings, hotels, industrial properties and 
retail shopping centers. 
One particularity of MBS is the possibility of prepayment, especially residential mortgages 
loans, so they are similar to callable bonds. From an investor’s point of view, it has a lot of risk, 
such as prepayment risk, which can be translated into cash-flow uncertainty due to prepayment 
before MBS’ maturity, and reinvestment risk in the case where reinvestments occur when 
interest rates decrease.  
A Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) is a structured product backed by portfolios of assets. 
The assets that may constitute these portfolios are bonds, loans, securitized receivables, ABS, 
tranches of other CDOs, or credit derivatives referencing any of the former. There are different 
types of CDOs depending on type of products that back them: Collateralized Loan Obligations 
(CLO) are backed exclusively by a portfolio of loans; Collateralized Bond Obligations (CBO) 
are backed by a portfolio of secured or unsecured senior or junior bonds (may be corporate or 
sovereign bonds); and Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMO) are backed by mortgage-
backed securities (MBSs), also called mortgage pass through securities. 
Some CDOs can be classified as Synthetic: the underlying assets remain in the sponsor’s bank 
balance sheet, so they are not transferred to the SPV. It happens when the sponsor bank buys 
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credit protection as credit default swaps or issues credit-linked notes. The importance of this 
may be related with customers’ relations, because a bank retains the underlying bonds/loans in 
its balance sheet.  
An important feature of structured products market is the fact that that they are generally traded 
Over-The-Counter (OTC), meaning the securities are traded in a platform different from a 
formal exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Consequently, as defined in 
Dodd (2017), these platforms are less transparent and operate under fewer rules. For example, 
the price is not necessarily equal across all customers and dealers. Another aspect that can 
happens in this type of market is that dealers can simply leave the market, and so liquidity issues 
may arise and affect the market stability. This characteristic typically implies high transaction 
costs that may be large enough to discourage investors from entering in transactions, mainly in 
the secondary market. The issuer will also generally charge a premium for hedging expenses 
and for the construction and “packaging” of complex products.  
There are also less explicit costs, such as the fact that when holding a product with a return 
dependent on an index performance, the investor is not exposed to the dividends return 
associated with that index. This could easily be translated in a 2 to 5 percentage points lower 
return – historical dividend data values from the indexes FTSE (FTSE Dividend Data, 2017) 
and S&P 500 (S&P Dividend Data, 2017) – than if the investor was directly exposed to the 
index. These characteristics will consequently shape investors strategies when working with 
these securities.  
There are common features in both the primary and secondary markets that will essentially 
define the way demand, supply and prices work with this type of products. A lot of structured 
products available in the market have protection guaranteeing the principal payment, leading 
investors to look to these products as almost risk-free.  
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Looking to the primary market, it is commonly appointed that products tend to be overpriced. 
This result is demonstrated in an analysis of the German market, produced by Stoimenov and 
Wilkens (2005), and of the Swiss market by Grünbichler and Wohlwend (2005). There are 
justifications that appear to explain this behavior. For instance, this may be due to the hedge 
costs the issuer has to incur in to protect his position, which are especially high given the 
combination of different products offered in this type of products. In fact, it was observed that 
products with more exotic options would imply higher premiums, which aligns with this 
explanation. 
Concerning the secondary market, being underused (Moore, 2014) and lacking in regulation 
and transparency can at times create an almost quasi-monopolist power that sets the rules. The 
non-existence of universal price models may also contribute to this effect. In fact, the price 
models used by each institution might be possibly wrong due to the complexity of each product, 
given, for instance, the difficulty to incorporate option value, consequently leading to 
incorrectly priced products. 
A relevant point in this market is the fact that issuers or large hedge funds may become the 
main suppliers of the secondary market and so, due to their size, have the power to set the price 
and control the quantities available in the market. As mentioned by Grünbichler and Wohlwend 
(2005), the price in the secondary market could even seem to be underpriced. However, that 
scenario is in fact a demonstration of the power of those institutions, since the products from 
the lead managers that seem to be undervalued are the ones in which the valuation is the most 
time dependent. In other words, the products from these institutions are the ones whose 
valuation varies more through the life-cycle of the product. Consequently, the undervaluation 
could be simply a price level that incentivizes investors to hold the products whose valuation 
varies more according to the life cycle. 
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Also, the issuer is capable of detecting future demand for the products and consequently adjust 
prices. These large companies can use their information of the market to make their products 
more attractive, for instance setting prices below fair value to attract investors to roll-over from 
other investments that are reaching maturity (Grünbichler & Wohlwend, 2005). 
Market characteristics such as the mismatch between demand and supply, and the inexistence 
of a well-defined pricing model may also imply that when an investor needs or desires to sell a 
product in the secondary market, the price may be undervalued, and the investor will have to 
accept the market conditions usually set by the big institutions.  
Another important aspect that constrains the way investors interact in the secondary market is, 
as previously mentioned, the high transaction costs associated with OTC transaction. From the 
issuer’s (seller) perspective, these costs can make operations attractive, even with a less fair 
valuation; from the investors’ perspective, these costs can make the secondary market activity 
harmful. This is an important aspect that restraints a lot the activity in the secondary market. 
However, the tendency of the price to become closer to the fair value as maturity approaches 
was observed in the secondary market as demonstrated by Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005), in 
their analysis of the German market. 
Nevertheless, this type of products seems to be interesting to investors that intend to follow a 
buy-and-hold strategy, as the products tend to pay higher coupons comparing to other simpler 
products. As these products are many times linked to indexes, protected by reserves and by 
derivatives, they can become very attractive products for loss aversion investors.  
However, an investor needs to be warned that a higher return is usually implies higher risk. As 
the payoff of structured products seems to be complex and dependent on several factors, such 
as the prepayment rate, this may lead investors to wrong inferences and probabilities 
misestimation, as suggested by Hens and Rieger (2008). Still, there is a possibility that the extra 
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return could be justified by the market being underexplored and by the asymmetry of 
information that exists on it.  
Indeed, it is always pertinent to remember that even products with principal protection can fail, 
as it happened with several products from Lehman Brothers, that were capital guaranteed and 
in the end delivered zero capital. Structured products can offer very good protections and return, 
but an investor needs to be well aware of their complexity, as returns depend on several market 
conditions, and consequently are highly time variant. They must always remember that 
unimaginable scenarios can always happen. 
Looking from an investor’s perspective, the market characteristics previously referred may 
allow for speculation to occur. From our research, it was found that the opportunities to make 
high returns are justified by the unclear market that is an OTC market, where there is not enough 
public information to lead markets to an efficient interaction between the involved parties. 
Moreover, this type of platform usually has high transaction costs. There is also the fact that 
the pricing mechanisms used are not clearly defined and publicly disclosed, which aligns with 
the fact that different institutions and investors probably have different information, leading to 
different price levels in the market. This combined with the market underused leads to 
inefficiency. All the uncertainty associated with OTC markets and the products complexity will 
create the need for the issuer to make the products more attractive.  
The lack of liquidity in this market, mainly justified by the unclear OTC market, the complexity 
of these type of products, and the difficulty to reach equal and fair prices due to the possible 
returns being dependent on multiple factors, may contribute to the existence of market 
opportunities that can be exploited by investors. In other words, there may exist highly 
speculative opportunities. 
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On the one hand, the issuer needs to make their products attractive, leading to the higher 
coupons typically seen in these products when comparing to simpler products, or simply lower, 
seemingly undervalued prices. In fact, historically, according to Moody’s, they have been 
available on the primary market below par, i.e. the security is being traded below face value, 
meaning it is at discount.  
On the other hand, when playing in the secondary market due to the lack of liquidity, investors 
intending to sell their products may be forced to sell them at lower prices. Good investment 
opportunities can also be justified by the different price mechanisms used by the market 
participants.  
In these market circumstances, where there is a lot of uncertainty and suspicion about this type 
of products, and the existence of opportunities to make superior returns can be exploited by 
investors, is where Moody´s Analytics operates, aiming to create a basket of services and tools 
to help investors better understand the market and its products, by combining historical data 
with the right tools to create projections on how each product can perform. 
In order to make the activity in the OTC market clearer and more transparent, several 
institutions were created, not only to better explain what a structured product is, and the type of 
products available, but also to increase the regulation and the transparency of this market. 
Associations as the Deutscher Derivate Verband or the programme created by FINRA 
(Financial Industry Regulatory Authority), called TRACE transparency project in the market, 
work with the purpose of making this market less opaque. In Bessembinder, Maxwell and 
Venkataraman (2006), it was found that with the implementation of TRACE transparency 
project in the market, transaction costs showed significant decreases, close to 50%, and even 
bonds that were not under the same requirements showed reductions of 20%.   
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2.2. Constant Default Rate (CDR) and Constant Prepayment Rate (CPR) 
 
This section aims at introducing the concepts that were the baseline of our analysis and, in 
several cases, used as inputs. The Constant Default Rate (CDR) and Constant Prepayment rate 
(CPR) are two important concepts, for both the borrowing and lending party, to consider when 
entering in a loan agreement. 
The CDR is the annualized default rate on  a pool of mortgages, typically within a collateralized 
product, as would be the case of mortgage-backed securities (MBS), described above. This 
percentage represents the outstanding principal balances on the pool of loans that is in default, 
which in most of the cases implies that the loan contract is in the foreclosure process (occurring 
when the borrowers fails on the payments and the lender auctions the property to the highest 
bidder). Considering this, one could expect a positive relationship between the CDR and the 
yield on a loan. In other words, the lender would require a premium to hold an asset with default 
risk, being the premium on the yield an increasing function of the default rate. To test this effect, 
we ran simulations on Moody´s Structured Finance Portal’s (this service is further explained in 
the next section) set of tranches where the default rate was the varying input. For a specific 
tranche on a mortgage-backed security, we started the exercise by running the baseline scenario, 
in which we take the Moody´s Portal’s inputs as given, assuming every other variable constant. 
The following steps consisted on increasing and decreasing the default rate input and observing 
its impact on the yield for that tranche. To summarize, the results were in line with the 
expectations, confirming the theoretical introduction to this rate, as we could observe the 
positive relationship between the CDR and the yield on the loan. 
On the other hand, the CPR is a loan prepayment rate equal to the proportion of the principal in 
group of mortgages that is paid off prematurely in each period. As it will be further explained 
in a later section, prepayment may arise for several reasons, including lower refinancing rates 
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for the loan, the case where the property ceases to exist or when the borrower experiences an 
increase in wealth. This action constitutes a risk for the lender (and to the holder of the 
structured product indexed to the mortgages) because it ceases the loan contract and the 
associated cash flows, mainly the interest that the lender receives for providing the loan. 
Therefore, similarly to the CDR, in this case an increase in the prepayment rate will increase 
the return required on the asset, i.e. a higher yield. To test the effect, we have performed a 
similar exercise to the one for the CDR based on simulations, but instead of varying the CDR, 
we varied the CPR and observed the effect on the yield-to-maturity. The results were in line 
with the previously mentioned expected implications on the return of the fixed income 
derivative asset. However, contrary to the CDR conclusions, this is not so linear, since in some 
cases prepayment might actually be beneficial and preferred by the lender, when looking to 
situations with a high expected default risk associated. If we consider the case where there is a 
high probability of failure on the payments and the loan is repaid due to an unexpected event 
that increases the wealth of the borrower, such as inheritance or winning a lottery, this risk is 
reduced, and the lender becomes better off for not having to account for so many case-scenarios 
where the counterparty would default. In the case the loan is fully repaid, the risk is reduced to 
0% and the lender does not have to consider any default scenarios. However, it is worth 
considering this as a rare case with an extremely low probability of actually happening. 
Considering this, one should be careful when analysing the latter concept, because its 
effect can be ambiguous: a higher CPR can either correspond to a higher YTM, since higher 
historical prepayments would result in less expected cash flows in the form of interest 
payments, or lead to a decrease in the YTM due to the perceived decreased riskiness associated 
with the full repayment of the loan.   
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3. Moody’s Structured Finance Portal and the Interest Payments Project 
 
In this section, we define and describe the Structured Finance Portal, our main tool for this 
project, where we had access to all tranches and where we have conducted the simulations to 
obtain our results. At a second point, we introduce and describe briefly an intermediate project 
we did with Moody’s Analytics to correct flaws on an excel file due to a time lapse on interest 
payments, where we had to consider the day-to-year count on leap years versus non-leap years. 
3.1. The Portal 
 
The Structured Finance Portal is an online portal designed especially for investors in structured 
products, such as ABS, MBS and CDO, in order to easily analyze individual products and 
portfolios. The portal is comprised of three modules, including the monitoring module, used for 
comparative analytics, the cash flow module for cash flow analytics, and the regulatory module 
for instant regulatory metrics. 
In the first module, investors can consult all the data about each deal and its tranches; for 
instance, capital structure (that includes currency, original balance, current balance, maturity, 
spread, interest index, payment frequency, and rating), information about counterparties, and 
relevant documents, performance, and history of payments are available. All these data allow 
investors to understand easily how each deal and its tranches are performing, and the data can 
be exported to Excel to be analysed as each investor prefers.  
The second module is composed by dynamic cash flows, where investors can perform different 
simulations for a chosen deal, and see how it behaves for different values of CPR, CDR, and 
call assumptions (if it is hold until maturity, or if it is exercised). It is also possible to see the 
cash flows, and other relevant data, such as yield, discount margin, IRR, loss, and collateral 
performance. 
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In the regulatory module, several regulatory documents are available, and investors can perform 
simulations for their portfolios in order to analyse the different risk weights. 
Despite its usefulness, while working on a frequent basis with the Structured Finance Portal, 
we have found some limitations. First, we believe that a Portal so widely used should be more 
efficient, as it usually breaks, takes too long to flow from one section to the other, or in some 
cases, even within the same section. Also, as the Portal is open to clients, the abbreviations of 
key variables (as is the case of the CPR and CDR) should be disclosed in a complementary 
note. The same recommendation applies to the formulas used to compute the different metrics 
presented. On a third point, considering our careful analysis and study on the metrics, we 
recommend adding some additional metrics to the ones presented in the Portal, as is presented 
further on. Adding to these, and considering that we have analysed a considerable number of 
tranches in the Portal, we have noticed that there was a considerable amount of information 
missing on a wide range of parameters and different sections, mainly on the section comprising 
the historical performance of the asset. Following on this point, we occasionally found 
information missing on the graphical representations. Mainly, we found cases where we could 
select a wide range of parameters to observe on a graphic, but only a few would return values 
and display the respective graph. Finally, in the cases where we had values, these would not 
always be consistent, in a sense that they were not within the acceptable range for the metric 
and did not make theoretical sense. An example of this would be the pool factor, one of the 
default variables presented on all the tranches of the Structured Finance Portal. The pool factor 
is simply the current balance of the loan divided by its initial balance. On one hand, we would 
expect it to decrease over time as the loan is repaid. On the other hand, if the loan is refinanced 
at some point in time, it may happen that the factor increases and, in the case where the bond is 
fully refinanced, that it increases to one. However, we have observed in more than one case a 
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factor above one, and the current balance of the bond would not justify that value, which would 
be inconsistent.  
We believe that these recommendations, when applied, would enhance the Portal experience 
for the end users. 
3.2. Interest Payment Project 
 
On a middle project, we also had the chance to work with other Moody’s Analytics’ tools, 
namely an Excel file on stress testing, and had the opportunity to correct some flaws. The most 
relevant one being the fact that annual interest payments that happened after the 28th of February 
in leap years were inserted as input, so they were not calculated in Excel, and considered that 
366 days had passed since the last payment, while simultaneously considering that the year’s 
duration is 365 days, and the other way around in years following the leap year. Since the Excel 
model considered that a full year had passed between dates, there was a mismatch between the 
interest as an input and the interest predicted by the model, which would result in the model 
predicting losses, and as a result would lead to a downgrade in the product’s rating.  
Downgrades in the ratings of structured products like Asset-Backed Securities are rare and 
usually followed by consequent negative returns, which also reflects the severity of downgrades 
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4. Metrics Project 
4.1. Introduction to metrics 
 
This section of the report aims at describing the metrics that were analysed and tested on a 
sample of tranches provided by Moody’s Analytics. After a careful analysis, we present the 
main results and conclusions about each metric’s relevance, and give a final opinion on whether 
Moody´s Analytics should add them to the Portal. 
In a financial environment that offers a diversified range of financial assets, metrics play an 
essential role on the decision process. These can be used as the baseline of a score system for 
each unique investor background, to measure the risk-reward relation, to choose the best assets 
to meet financial needs or simply to compare different assets with similar requirements. 
Moreover, metrics assess the different dimensions of risk at a security level and at a portfolio 
level. 
Our analysis focuses on structured fixed income assets, mainly on how each metric behaves 
within different deals and associated tranches, in terms of seniority, maturity and cash flows. 
This section aims at understanding how these perform under different scenarios, having as 
ultimate objective to measure these effects and assess the different types of risk that each 
involved party bears by entering in the deal with specific contractual conditions.  
The metrics were grouped into four main groups: Input metrics, Spreads & Returns, Risk 
measures, and the Greeks. Within each group, we present them in our perceived order of 
relevance (from most relevant to least relevant) for structured products, particularly for the type 
of structured products we dealt with. The analysis starts with a theoretical background on each 
metric, followed by a practical interpretation reflected by our expectations on their behaviour 
under different scenarios. The third step involves the metrics calculation on a sample of tranches 
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and inputs from the portal. Finally, we provide the results, the main conclusions based on an 
expectation versus reality matching process, and conclude on the relevancy of each metric. 
4.2. Input Metrics 
 
The metrics that constitute this sub-chapter are three metrics that from our view have an 
enormous impact when analyzing structured products, and consequently lead investors to better 
decisions. The more accurate projections we have regarding Interest Rates, Prepayment and 
Call Option exercise (the metrics on this section), the more accurate the results on returns, 
maturity, and risk for structured products, the subjects assessed in the next sub-chapters, which 
typically use these three as inputs in the calculations. 
4.2.1. Projected Interest rates 
 
Valuable as it reflects current economic conditions and future expectations. 
Definition: 
Projected interest rates are the forecasted rates for bonds maturing in the future. The 
methodologies vary widely across different institutions. For this project, the projected interest 
rates were assumed to be the forward curves for Libor, Euribor and GBP Libor available in the 
SF Portal. The curve tends to reflect the expectations for the future. Normally, the yield curve 
is shifted upwards because it reflects inflation, thus positive expectations regarding the future 
economy. 
Interpretation/Results: 
We could observe that all three curves show an upward trend, with a flattening of the curve in 
the longer run. It is also important to note that the Euribor starts out with negative values, 
denoting the current prospects of interest rates in the Eurozone, which are still dropping. 
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According to the presented forward curve, the expectations are for them to only become positive 
in around 2 years. 
As a forward curve is computed through the spot rates, the shape of the curve makes sense 
considering a normal economic scenario, in which economic agents add a premium for the 
uncertainty of future economic conditions, stabilizing in the more distant future, for which 
expectations cannot be made completely yet.  
Considering this, this metric is useful and relevant for at least one fundamental reason: it reflects 
current economic conditions and future expectations. To illustrate this, consider the case where 
there is a credit crash, and nobody is willing to lend money because of fear of not getting paid 
back. This would invert the normal interest rates curve, since, in this situation, current interest 
rates would be extremely high, as economic agents would require high premiums to lend 
money. However, the situation is not expected to hold indefinitely and as the economic outlook 
is expected to improve, agents demand a lower premium for future dates.  
4.2.2. CPR Estimation: Richard and Roll (Goldman Sachs Model) 
  
Valuable, as it is more adaptable to different products than the PSA model. 
Definition: 
One of the most popular ways to replicate the prepayment behavior in a pool of loans is by 
using the Public Securities Association (PSA) Standard Prepayment Model. The intuition 
behind this model is that in the beginning, the rate of prepayment on loans is low, linearly 
growing until it stabilizes. However, Moody’s Analytics asked us for an alternative to the PSA 
Prepayment model, hence we present the Richard and Roll (1989) model. Unlike the PSA 
Prepayment model (which simply assumes a linear growth of the CPR and then stabilizes it), 
this model can be adapted to different products, hence having better prepayment prediction 
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power. It considers factors like the current incentive for homeowners to refinance, the maturity 
of the product, seasonality, and the current pool.  
The refinancing incentive can be calculated the following way: 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  0.28 − 0.14 ∗
arctan (−8.571 + 430 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒). With the 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 being the Weighted Average Coupon 
– Mortgage Rate prevailing at that time.  
The seasoning/age of the mortgage variable applies the reasoning behind the PSA model: in the 
first months, the prepayment is low, increasing until it stabilizes.  
The month of the year multiplier considers the month of the year and associates a given 
multiplier. Starting from January until December we considered: 0.94, 0.76, 0.74, 0.95, 0.98, 
0.92, 0.98, 1.1, 1.18, 1.22, 1.23 and 0.98. 
The Burnout multiplier which can be calculated the following way:  
𝐵𝑀(𝑡) = 0.3 + 0.7 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
Finally, 𝐶𝑃𝑅 = 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡 
Since this metric was suggested by Moody’s Analytics, it was not present on the SF Portal. 
However, most of the inputs were available, except for the prevailing mortgage rate. 
Interpretation/Results: 
The downside of this model is the need to estimate and adapt the models that deliver the 
factors/inputs of the main model. 
Moreover, the CPR is an annual measure, since payments are often made monthly, so one 
should transform the CPR in a Single Monthly Mortality Rate (SMM) the following way: 
𝑆𝑀𝑀 = 1 − (1 − 𝐶𝑃𝑅)
1
12. Both the CPR and the SMM are in percentage of the scheduled 
principal balance for that month. In order to apply these measures, one should calculate the 
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scheduled principal (regardless of the prepayment) and then subtract the respective percentage 
given by the SMM, which should result in the actual principal balance.   
4.2.2.1. Empirical performance of the Richard & Roll model (Luís Bettencourt  
Individual report) 
 
In this section we will compare how this model behaves in comparison to the Public Securities 
Association (PSA) Prepayment Model empirically. The importance of accounting for 
prepayment risk resides in the fact that the loans backing the MBSs are mortgages, therefore 
the homeowners (borrowers) have the option to anticipate principal payments. Although one 
could see that anticipated payments reduce the riskiness of the product, it will also affect the 
cash flows during its life spam since the interest will be calculated upon a lower principal.   
The Richard and Roll (1989) model determines a CPR by calculating the product of the 
following four multipliers: Refinancing Incentive, this multiplier is obtained by modelling a 
relationship between CPRs and a refinancing incentive that is given by the difference between 
the Weighted Average Coupon (a weighted average of the rates in a pool of mortgages using 
the pools as the respective weights) and a refinancing rate which we will assume as the ten year 
mortgage rate, and fit it in the following equation: 𝐶𝑃𝑅 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 arctan (𝑐 + 𝑑(𝑊𝐴𝐶 −  𝑟10𝑦)). 
This should behave like a call option of a stock in the sense that when the refinancing incentive 
is below zero the CPR should be low since homeowners don’t have an incentive to refinance 
their mortgages when the new rate (𝑟10𝑦) is higher than their current one (𝑊𝐴𝐶), moreover, 
from this point onwards there is an incentive for refinancing and the CPR should increase 
quickly and then reach a flat level; Month Multiplier, this factor tries to capture the empirical 
evidence that prepayments are higher in Summer/Autumn months, Huang (2006) points to the 
seasonality of house turnover, weather and school schedules as possible factors; Seasoning 
Multiplier, this translates another empirical evidence that prepayments are lower at the 
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inception and then gradually increase, arguing that homeowners are less likely to refinance new 
loans; and Burnout Multiplier, which accounts for the fact that prepayments decrease over 
time since borrowers who are more likely to refinance do it early, therefore this multiplier takes 
into account the current balance as percentage of the original balance (Pool Factor), thus 
decreasing the CPR of older loans.     
The PSA prepayment model only follows the logic of the Seasoning Multiplier by assuming 
the CPR to increase linearly from 0% in the first month to 6% in the 30th month. However, there 
are variants to the PSA model. The previous one is considered the 100% PSA model, a 200% 
PSA model would increase linearly until 12% in the 30th month, so one can adjust the model to 
the expected level of prepayment of the product. 
The data used was available in the Moody’s SF Portal, besides the mortgage rates which were 
made available by the Eurosystem. The chosen securities were the ones that were both available 
to this project and that had all the required data to estimate the CPRs, which resulted in a total 
of 233 historical payments from 6 different securities as observations. Moreover, the parameters 
considered for the Richard and Roll (1989) model are: refinancing multiplier = 0.28 +
0.14 arctan (−8.571 + 430 ∗ (𝑊𝐴𝐶 −  𝑟10𝑦)), as suggested by Pachamanova and Fabozzi 
(2010); month multipliers are, from January to December respectively, 0.94, 0.76, 0.74, 0.95, 
0.98, 0.92, 0.98, 1.11, 1.18, 1.22, 1.23 and 0.98, these were taken directly from the Richard and 
Roll (1989) paper; seasoning multiplier is equal to minimum between the maturity in months 
divided by 30 and 1; and the burnout multiplier is equal to 0.3 + 0.7 * Pool, these last two 
factors were also suggested by Pachamanova and Fabozzi (2010). 
The following procedure was performed to compare both models: estimate each model’s CPR, 
as described before, and take the absolute of the difference between the results and the reported 
CPR given by Moody’s SF Portal (by taking the absolute, we give the same importance to 
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deviations above and below the reported CPR). While the PSA Model CPRs’ deviated 354 basis 
points on average from empirical data, the Richard and Roll (1989) model deviated on average 
402 basis points from reality, and was also empirically closer than the PSA model only 40.77% 
of the times. We also found which would be the in-sample optimum level for the PSA model, 
the level that returns the lowest average of deviations from empirical data, which was 124.5% 
and returned 336 basis points of average deviation. Since it was obtained through an in-sample 
optimization, it should necessarily return better results than the 100% PSA model.         
Although at first sight this should imply that the Richard and Roll (1989) model does not predict 
efficiently the CPR, we will present arguments that may explain the model’s poor performance. 
Firstly, the data used to model multipliers such as the Refinancing Incentive or Month 
Multipliers is North American, while in the sample we predicted CPRs for European deals, and 
since the latter is influenced by seasonality and housing turnover, it should be based on how 
Europeans react to those factors, moreover it considers data from almost three decades ago. 
Hence, the parameters should be frequently adjusted with recent and appropriate data, 
regardless of the theory behind the model which is logical and applicable or adaptable to both 
North American and European, for example both should behave accordingly when facing lower 
refinancing rates in comparison to their current mortgage (regarding the refinancing incentive). 
Another reason that can justify the model’s performance is the calculation of the refinancing 
multiplier. Among the four factors, the refinancing incentive is the preponderant one in 
determining the CPR while the others just adjust it, hence the concern of having its model 
estimated properly. The model with the inverse function of tangent becomes flat for both the 
lowest and highest values, so it only starts to “react” when it reaches refinancing values above 
0 (when the homeowner option to refinance is “in the money”) and then it starts to become 
constant afterwards when it reaches values around 3% of refinancing incentive. This is relevant 
for our analysis since in our data the refinancing incentive was positive only 10 times out of the 
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233 observations (4.29%), moreover, when calculating the average of the absolute of the 
deviations while only considering the observations with positive refinancing incentives it goes 
from the previous 402 basis points to 172 basis points. Although this would suggest that under 
these circumstances the model performs better, one should consider that the sample is of only 
10 observations and that having a negative refinancing incentive is common. 
In conclusion, theoretically there is a logical reasoning behind the Richard and Roll (1989) 
model that can be applied to MBSs regardless of their origin. Although the results suggest that 
the PSA model outperforms this model, we believe that if one estimates new parameters using 
data that is recent and geographically or demographically relatable to the respective security, 
one could get a better performance from the model. 
4.2.3. Call Projection 
 
Could be highly valuable, however it is necessary to develop a model to catch the 
impact of the several factors. 
Definition: 
There are several factors that matter when deciding whether to exercise a call option. The most 
famous is changes in interest rates. When issuers have a call option on the outstanding debt, 
they have the power to redeem securities. In a very simplified world, they will exercise this 
option when interest rates go down, as they can now access debt at lower prices.  
However, several other reasons interfere in the decision.  Factors as company risk, extra 
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Interpretation/Results: 
When a company’s risk increases, debt will become more expensive due to the company profile. 
Even if general debt cost decreases, it may not compensate the increase in the specific risk 
profile. 
Regarding extra commissions, we have to take into account the fact that going to the market to 
buy back debt, and then (after it moves) to refund again, will imply extra commission costs that 
have to be taken into consideration in the final decision. 
Inflation is also a relevant factor when exercising an option, since if the nominal interest rates 
go up, it does not necessarily mean that real interest rates follow that movement. Real interest 
rates equal the nominal interest rate less inflation; therefore, if a increase in a nominal interest 
rate is overcome by an increase of inflation, the issuer will decide not to exercise the option. 
The decision to buy back debt implies the necessity to have the whole amount of money on 
hand. In the case you cannot get new funding before the repurchasing, this implies an interest 
loss as it will be necessary to use reserves that could be gaining interest. Another important 
point that is highly related to this one is liquidity, as the transaction requires the existence and 
availability of high quantities of money. 
All these factors will interfere in the decision to exercise a call option. It does not depend only 
on interest rates fluctuations. 
This tool can be very useful to investors as these products are typically exposed to the options 
being exercised; consequently, investors’ return and investment life time may be affected. With 
this metric, investors can create more realistic expectations. 
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This can be very hard to predict and there is not yet any model to make this projection. In the 
section “A new approach to project structured products returns”, a suggestion on how we can 
try to predict call date is presented.  
4.3. Spreads & Returns 
 
In the following section, we will discuss metrics related to the return of the products. Returns 
allow investors to be aware of the performance of their investments and if they are being 
properly rewarded for their level of risk. One of the main characteristics of structured products 
is the fact that they rarely reach maturity, therefore the prediction of return should take this into 
account. 
This characteristic arises from the fact that the product usually has an embedded call option 
from the selling side, which is often exercised by the issuer since it may happen that as the 
product’s life moves towards maturity the principal of the product diminishes, such that the 
costs of maintaining the remaining principal are higher than its return, hence the call is 
exercised. Also, another factor is the uncertainty of the cash flows, either because of the risk of 
default of the pool’s loans, or the prepayment risk in the case of CDOs and MBSs. 
Moreover, some of the metrics are Spreads, which allow investors to evaluate the return from 
an incremental point of view relative to a benchmark (usually the treasury bill curve or an 
interest rate swap curve).  
These metrics should address the expected returns under different scenarios, mainly considering 
the different possible maturities the structured product may reach. 
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4.3.1. Spreads 
4.3.1.1. Option-Adjusted Spread for Prepayment 
 
Valuable because it considers the prepayment options and time effect. 
Definition: 
The OAS for prepayment is calculated as the difference between the Z-spread, explained further 
on, and the option of prepayment (Pereira, 2017): 
Z − spread(%) = OAS(%) + Option Cost(%)(Prepayment) 
As previously mentioned, prepayment is most common in low interest rates environments, and 
it might be a risk for the bondholder because once the issuer makes an early payment of the 
bond, its holder stops receiving the Cash Flows inherent to the asset. However, it may constitute 
the case where the bond has a substantial risk of default and its holder actually benefits from 
the fact that it is prepaid, which would happen if for example the borrower suffers an unexpected 
increase in the wealth. This would not be taken into account in ex-ante expectations, but in the 
realized return of the bond. Also, it is worth mentioning that this is a rare case with an extremely 
low probability of happening in reality. 
Interpretation/Results: 
To obtain the value of the OAS, we have used the results from the simulations ran on the 
Structured Finance Portal. The scenarios used for the simulations assumed a set of inputs for 
specific tranches from a given basket of deals given. The main difference between the two 
scenarios was that the first would assume that the bond was carried until the maturity date, and 
the second assumed that the bond would be called before reaching the maturity date. Therefore, 
the option value was obtained as the difference between the first scenario and the one where 
the bond would be called. Finally, the Z-spread was given directly in the portal. The OAS was 
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calculated as the difference between the Z-spread and the option value, using the relation in the 
formula described above. However, it is worth noting that this procedure, which was a Moody´s 
indication, is part of a simple exercise we did in the Portal to illustrate the effect that the 
existence of the option, has on the bond, and that real options prices are not computed using 
this methodology as the option value is the result of several different scenarios that may occur. 
 Regarding the results, in all deals and tranches considered, the prepayment option was 
negative. This result implies an OAS bigger than the Z-spread meaning that the return received 
by the investor when removing the return implied with the option exercise, is larger than when 
accounting with the option. This can be explained by the fact that when there is a considerably 
high prepayment rate, issuers face the risk of having the sum of the time weighted payments 
decreased, assuming a constant price, the investor return may end decreasing due to the 
We do believe OAS should be included, not only applied to the prepayment option but also to 
the call option, as this spread denotes the true return from the security itself, without the options, 
making it more correct for comparisons to products without options. 
As previously mentioned, this metric is more reasonable than the Z-spread, as the first one 
removes the option value from the security making it more correct to compare to other products 
in particular when looking to portfolios with stripped securities. 
Therefore, when working with structured products, which are typically exposed to prepayment 
options, OAS is a better metric than the Z-spread. The Z-spread assumes products reach 
maturity and that its cash-flows are not affected by the option, consequently it gives a spread 
that it is highly probable to be wrong. Being it more correct to use the OAS that clean the option 
risk looking to total spread of the security in the best scenario (Z-spread) minus the risk/cost 
associated with that option.  
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4.3.1.2. Option-Adjusted Spread Applied to Calls 
 
Valuable because it considers the call option’s value and time effect. 
Definition: 
As mentioned by Pereira (2017a), the option-adjusted spread for callable bonds is the spread of 
a fixed income security that is adjusted to take into account the embedded option, by removing 
the option value, on other words by removing the percentage value associated with the specific 
risk of the option. The call option benefits the issuer of the bond because it gives the option to 
buy back the bond if rates increase, i.e. if the bond’s price goes down. Following this, investor 
will demand an extra return for holding a bond with this feature. For instance, considering a 
product with an embedded option, for compensate the extra return the issuer pays a higher 
coupon. It is not correct to simply do not take into consideration the associate risk to the option 
and compare the spread in this situation (Z-spread) to the spread of a security with no embedded 
option and consequently no option risk. In order to do a fair comparison, it should be subtracted 
to the Z-spread the cost (risk) associated with the option.  
The Option-Adjusted Spread (OAS) for a bond with an embedded option is the value that 
solves: 
For a callable bond, or bonds with prepayment options: 
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑(%) = 𝑂𝐴𝑆(%) + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(%) 
On the other hand, if we were looking to calculate a puttable bond, the formula would be: 
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑(%) = 𝑂𝐴𝑆(%) − 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(%) 
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where the Z-spread is computed as described further in Z-spread) and the embedded Option 
Value is computed with an option pricing model. 
Interpretation/Results: 
Regarding factors that affect OAS, let us first observe the implications of a call option. A call 
option in a bond gives the issuer the right to buy back the bond, meaning that when market 
conditions are favorable to the issuer – namely lower interest rates –, the option to buy back 
the bond is available, thus increasing reinvestment risk to investors, who as a result will demand 
a higher yield to compensate. Therefore, the option adjusted spread of a callable bond should 
be smaller than the Z-spread. 
As OAS removes the option exercise risk, it is a superior measure to compare returns between 
products with different characteristics, which a normal z-spread and nominal spread do not take 
into account. As structured products’ cash flows may be highly volatile due to the embedded 
call options, which are typically exercised before maturity, this metric should be a better 
approach than the Z-spread to compare to other products that may not have embedded options. 
When working with structured products it should be used the OAS and not the Z-spread as the 
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4.3.1.3. Spread to Option Adjusted Spread (Prepay) 
 
Valuable as it allows investors to easily analyze the extra reward of holding this type of 
risk. 
Definition: 
This metric is commonly used in the market, to understand it, the OAS and Z-Spread concept 
must be clear. When considering two similar products, with one of them with an embedded 
option and the other without, it is not fair to compare the total return of these products as 
captured by the Z-spread. To make the analysis right, the OAS should be used, since it will be 
adjusted to take into consideration an embedded option, giving a more accurate spread of the 
product as it removes from the Z-spread the cost that come from the option. And then, it is 
possible to compare the option return with its risk. 
Spread to OAS gives a relation of the extra spread demanded resultant from adding an option 
to a security. This comparison can be made through a ratio (division) (Function 1) or absolute 
difference (subtraction) (Function 2) – the former being a more relative value. Both approaches 
seem useful and quite similar but capable of different inferences. 




2) 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑍 − 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 − 𝑂𝐴𝑆 
In the case of structured products, there is the option of prepayments – consequently, the risk 
of less interest to an investor when comparing to a product without a prepayment option. Thus, 
it is expected investors are being rewarded to support the existence of this risk.  
Interpretation/Results: 
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To calculate this metric, we used the Z-spread and the OAS, both calculated as explained in 
their specific sections. 
In our scenarios, a negative return value was always associated with the prepayment option, 
which makes sense since the prepayment option will decrease investors’ interest payment. That 
way, investors will receive less return when the prepayment option is available comparing to 
an all equal scenario but with no CFs change due to the existence of the option – in other words, 
compared to the value given by the Z-spread.  
This metric is important as it gives investors the possibility to easily analyze the extra reward 
that they should demand due to the option exercise risk, and to compare in similar conditions 
how different tranches within the same deal are rewarded for that risk (since different tranches 
have a different exposure). Following this, it can be very useful to an investor looking to 
structured products, as these products typically have a prepayment option and so this option 
allows the investor to see what is the extra reward that may come from the option and compare 
it the associated risk. 
4.3.1.4. Spread to Weighted Average Life 
 
Valuable as it gives a more accurate value to the possible excess return that could come 
from each product. 
Definition: 
This metric was designed by us together Moody´s following their expectations on what it should 
measure, it is something new that is not currently being used in the market or by the institution. 
It gives the spread of a given security in the case in which the maturity equals the average life. 
The weighted Average Life concept is widely known and it is the average time to receiving 
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principal payments. It is a weighted average of the time until full repayment of principal, based 







Where P is the total principal, Pi is the principal repayment included the payment of period i, 
and 𝑡𝑖 is the time lag until payment i.  
In the particular case of structured products, this can be very useful due to prepayments and call 
options, as these particularities tend to affect the security maturity. Consequently, spread to 
WAL could be a better approach of the observed extra return.  
For instance, let us imagine an investment with 3 years but with a WAL of 2 years, with 
principal divided by the three periods (Price Function 1). In order to reach the yield to WAL 
it is necessary to distribute the total principal by the 2 periods (WAL) in order to reach a 
maturity of 2 in this new equation (Price Function 2). With the new principal distribution and 
with less one period, the yield that equalizes the discounted CFs to market price is the yield to 
WAL. 

















Where 𝑃𝑖 is the principal payment during period i, C is the Coupon payment and 𝑃´𝑖 is the 
principal payment considering a life time equal to WAL.  
Regarding structured products, the security life is typically smaller than the pre-specified 
maturity. Thus, spread to average life should lead to a more realistic value to investor. 
Another relevant point of this metric is that it is used to price MBS, such as CMOs issued by 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and others issued by private institutions. Usually 
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securities exposed to repurchase and prepayment risk that are trading below par are priced with 
the yield to average life due to price stability. 
Interpretation/Results: 
There are three main observations that arise from the analysis that was computed: 
1. A trend in the reduction of periods to maturity as CPR increases is usually observed. For 
example, a 10pp increase in the CPR was usually matched by a reduction of 2 periods of 
maturity. However, all this impact is conditional on the cash flows distribution within the 
tranches;  
2. Regarding the impact in yield, it has no apparent trend as it goes up and down. It is simply 
justified by the risk of each security, as sometimes, in the case of risky securities, guaranteeing 
the payment and paying it back faster is a plus. However, reducing the maturity implies less 
interest payment and so investors can require a higher yield; 
3. A problem observed with this metric was in the case where the principal payments are 
well-defined and not possible of change. Consequently, changes in CPR do not affect maturity 
and so this metric has no value in these cases. 
A similar metric that could be relevant and interesting to use would be  
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑
𝑊𝐴𝐿
. This metric can 
be useful as it allows to infer the return per a unit of average invested time, thus being a valuable 
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4.3.1.5. Spread to next call 
 
Valuable because it allows for a good comparison between different products under the 
same scenario. 
Definition: 
The Spread to next call was suggested by Moody’s Analytics and it uses a spread added to each 
point of a theoretical spot rate Treasury curve, such that when we apply them to discount the 
bond’s cash-flows we get its market price. The Spread to next call (s) is such that:  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 =
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛
(1 + 𝑟(0,1) + 𝑠)1
+ ⋯ +  
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛
(1 + 𝑟(0, 𝑇) + 𝑠)𝑇
+
𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
(1 + 𝑟(0, 𝑇) + 𝑠)𝑇
 
Although not available at the SF Portal, one could generate the cash-flows of the bond until the 
next callable date. 
Interpretation/Results: 
We want the spread(s) that sets the Bond’s cash-flows (until it is called in the next callable date) 
equal to the market price –  higher spreads mean higher risk for the Bond. 
It is a measure of the credit risk of the product when this is called, hence a higher value should 
indicate higher risk. This is particularly important since the one with the right to exercise the 
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4.3.1.6. Spread to Worst 
 
Valuable because allows investors to compare the excess return in the worst-case 
scenario across different products. 
Definition: 
Although not directly present in the Structured Finance Portal, this metric was calculated by 
running a scenario where the call option on the product is exercised as early as possible and 
another one where the product goes until maturity, and then choosing the lowest Yield from 
both scenarios. While in the first scenario the product stops earning interest earlier, in the 
second the product suffers the losses until the end.  
Interpretation/Results: 
The worst yield (Spread to Worst) among these scenarios informs the investor of the worst 
possible outcome. Both scenarios frequently ended up providing the same Yield and DM when 
ran in the SF Portal.  
A product presenting a higher Spread to Worst shows a relatively higher return when compared 











Not Valuable, although it takes into attention the time effect, it has the option value embedded 
and it runs until maturity 
Definition: 
Z-spread is the constant spread that gives the price of a bonds, as a sum of the present value of 
its cash flows when added to the yield at each point on the implied spot rate curve where a cash 
flow is received, assuming that the security reaches maturity. It is a better mechanism to 
calculate the spread to maturity than the nominal spread, as it takes into consideration time 
fluctuation through the use of the implied yield curve. In other words, it measures the spread 
that an investor will receive over the implied yield curve. (Fabozzi, 2007) 
P0 = ∑
Ci




where Ci is the total cash flow paid at time t as a fraction of par value, P0 stands for price of the 
bond, Present Value of cash flows, r(0, t) is the spot rate for maturity t, and z stands  for the z-
spread. 
The Z-spread allows to understand if there is any mispricing in a bond. It also represents the 
additional risk that is taken, such as credit risk, liquidity risk or option risk. As a result, a higher 
value of the z-spread indicates that a security has more risk, since the return offered must be 
higher to compensate for the increased risk. In case of bonds that have a call option, the purpose 
of a higher Z-spread is to cover the possibility of the security being called back. The option can 
also be a prepay option, which is very common in MBS, as it can have the possibility to prepay 
the principal. 
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Interpretation/Results: 
This metric is already used by Moody’s, although it is mentioned as “spread” and to get the Z-
spread we assumed that tranches were run until maturity.   
Analysing the values of Z-spread between different tranches over several deals, it is possible to 
conclude that more senior tranches have a lower Z-spread than junior ones, which is reasonable 
because more senior tranches are less risky than junior ones. 
Nevertheless, when considering a security with an embedded call option, Z-spread is not the 
best metric to compare this security’s return with the one from a security without an option, as 
it gives the total return of the security, including the option spread. If the objective is to compare 
the specific return of the products, z-spread is not the correct approach.  
This metric is easy to understand in terms of returns when additional risk is taken, although 
investors should be careful when analysing structured products, therefore the Option-adjusted 
spread should be preferred, as it gives the specific return of the product without the option. 
4.3.1.8. I-Spread 
 
Not valuable because OAS is a better approach when looking to products with 
embedded options. 
Definition: 
It is the difference between bond’s yield to maturity and interest rate swap, interpolated from 
the par Interest Rate Swap curve (CFA, 2015). I-spread can be considered as a risk premium. It 
overcomes the issue of maturity mismatch; however, it does not coincide to the yield to maturity 
of a traded reference bond. 
𝑌𝑇𝑀𝐶 = 𝐼𝑅𝑆 + 𝐼 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 
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𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  
𝐶
(1 + 𝐼𝑅𝑆 + 𝐼 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑) 
+ ⋯ +
𝐶 + 𝑃
(1 + 𝐼𝑅𝑆 + 𝐼 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑛 
 
where 𝑌𝑇𝑀𝐶  is the yield to maturity on the corporate bond, 𝐼𝑅𝑆 stands for the interpolated rate 
from the par Interest Rate Swap curve, C the coupon payment and P the principal payment. 
Interpretation/Results: 
This metric is not present on the Moody’s structured products portal, and to assess the impact 
of I-spread, we considered an initial price of 100 and respective yield, and according to its 
maturity and currency a correspondent Swap rate was used. In the analyzed deals, I-spread was 
higher than the yield when the interest swap rate was negative. Also, more senior deals have a 
lower I-Spread, that results from a lower yield.  
I-Spread considers the shape of the term structure of interest rates, though only in a very crude 
way, providing a spread that takes into consideration only a simple/linear benchmark yield. 
Consequently, the use of the Z-spread, which considers for each period the specific yield of a 
zero coupon with the right maturity and thus gives the extra return against a benchmark, while 
taking into consideration the right reinvestment risk, is a better metric when looking to the 
overall return of holding a product.  When comparing different products, Option-Adjusted 
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4.3.1.9. Nominal Spread 
 
Not valuable as structured products do not usually reach maturity. Also, due to time 
fluctuation, OAS is better for these products. 
 Definition: 
Nominal Spread is an existing metric commonly used. It is the difference between the yield to 
maturity that sets a security price equal to the current market price and the benchmark yield to 
maturity, generally the YTM of a similar maturity Treasury bond.  
In simple words it is how much more or less is the market willing to spend in that security 
against the benchmark yield to maturity. 
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑌𝑇𝑀 − 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑌𝑇𝑀 
This spread only takes into consideration a single moment in time, as it only needs the 
benchmark YTM – that is the YTM, at that time, of a treasury bill with a similar maturity as 
the product in analysis. It is consequently exposed to time volatility and also ignores the effect 
of options, as the market price and the coupon correspond to the product as a whole. It is 
possible to infer this by looking at the following function:  
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  
𝐶
(1 + 𝑅𝑓 + 𝑆) 
+
𝐶 + 𝑃
(1 + 𝑅𝑓 + 𝑆)𝑛 
 
where C is the coupon payment, P the principal, Rf stands for benchmark yield to maturity and 
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Interpretation/Results: 
This metric is broadly used, and it comes from the YTM that is frequently used to price 
products, mainly due to the fact that it is easily computed. This metric is not displayed in 
Moody´s portal yet, as the spread given by the portal is adjusting the benchmark for each period. 
However, there are two relevant main aspects: the fact it does not incorporate time variation, as 
it is fixed to a single point; and the fact it gives a return with the option embedded. 
Consequently, there are other metrics, such as the z-spread and the OAS, that are relatively 
better than this one.  
Concluding, we do not believe nominal spread is a relevant metric when dealing with structured 
products (which usually are not held until maturity), rendering this metric an inaccurate measure 
of the possible returns. Also, as this metric is not exposed to time 
4.3.2. Returns 
 
4.3.2.1. A new approach to project structured products returns (João Correia 
Individual Report) 
 
Introduction: Moody´s plays an important role supporting investors in their decisions to invest 
in structured products. However, the classic framework that are used or suggested by Moody´s 
do not allow to capture the complexity of this type of product and market conditions.  
Example of these products´ complexity is the fact that these products are usually dependent on 
call options, on underlying assets´ performance such as mortgages or assets performance, that 
can default or prepay, and they also depend on market conditions that define the collateral 
principal prepayment. Thus, a simple change in the market interest rate may imply a change in 
the prepayment rate or even imply the exercise of a call option, and change the expected CF´s 
distribution, with implication on the expected returns and maturity. 
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Focusing on some of the proposed metrics, the yield to maturity is not correct as these products 
do not usually reach maturity. The yield to average life (WAL) may be a better approach, as the 
investment horizon is possibly more accurate this way. However, it still is it is not the best 
approach as the average life manipulates the CF´s distribution to reach a maturity equal to 
WAL. As shown in the following formula 𝑊𝐴𝐿 =  ∑ 𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑃
, where t refers to payment period, 
Pt is the principal payment done at each period and P is the total principal, WAL takes only into 
account pre-defined principal distribution, not taking into account the market condition that 
could lead to change in prepayment rate nor the exercise of a call option. Another two analysis 
tools on this subject are the yield to next call and the yield to workout date. These metrics have 
limitations on forecasting the return and the security maturity, as they do not account for 
changes in principal distribution. Instead, they simply assume a date where the call will be 
exercised and force the call at that date, doing a principal balloon payment (example of this 
metric problem in appendix 1).  
Approach: In this section we suggest a new approach, that can be easily added to Moody´s 
portal, to project cash-flows distribution and consequently returns and maturity for structured 
products, particularly concerning mortgage backed securities (MBS). Taking into account the 
products´ complexity, namely the market condition and different factor that may affect CF´s 
distribution, we will focus on three aspects: a) Unscheduled Principal distribution, using the 
Richard and Roll (1989) model; b) Coupon payment- no changes suggested to Moody´s 
approach; c) Call-Option exercise date, defined in a rational way and based on historical data. 
a) Prepayment will affect all the principal distribution of these products and consequently the 
interest payments and so affecting return and maturity of investments. 
To project the unscheduled principal payment associated to each period it should be used the 
following formula 𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 = 𝐵𝑒𝑔.  𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 × [1 − (1 −




𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 ]. This formula combines the remaining principal available at the beginning of 
each period with the Constant Prepayment Rate (CPR) value and with the frequency associated 
to principal payment (e.g. monthly, quarterly, yearly). Please note the importance of the CPR, 
making it a necessary input that we need to project for each of the following periods of the 
product lifetime.  
To forecast the prepayment rate we suggest to do an adaption of the Richard and Roll (1989) 
model, which has the objective to create projection about prepayment rate for each period given 
the economic conditions observed at each period. With it we can create predictions today on 
how product cash-flows distribution may be affected. Being clear that this model was developed 
for MBS, we are currently focusing on these particular type of structured products. 
The model is based on four main factors: the tendency to refinance, seasonality, seasoning and 
burnout. The refinance incentive is the one which needs a deeper look. This factor compare 
what people are actually paying, in the form of weighted average coupon (WAC), to what they 
could be paying each period, being necessary to project these two inputs. 
Pachamanova and Fabozzi (2010) suggest using a 10 years’ mortgage rate to define what people 
could be paying. Following their suggestion, several mechanisms can be used to project the 10 
years rate in the next periods (r (t; t + 10)). Some methods more complex could be used such 
as econometrics models or a Monte Carlo simulation. We suggest a simpler way in order to 
make easier for Moody´s to implement the proposed approach to their portal. Our proposal 






− 1 , where the inputs r(0;t) and 
r(0;10+t) can be projected using several approaches. The inputs can be calculated using a linear 
interpolation or the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model. The model allows to construct an equation 
for mortgage rate and so reaching the necessary inputs directly, not requiring to produce an 
- 48 - 
 
interpolation, to calculate the future rate in place at time t, r (t; t + 10). We believe this is the 
best approach.   
























] where t is the maturity and a, b, c and 𝛾 are parameters to be estimated based on the 
following optimization process: minimize subject to a, b, c and 𝛾 of the 
∑ (𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑖 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 −  𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑖 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑁𝑆 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙) 𝐼𝑖=1 , where the 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑖 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑁𝑆 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 follows the rate proposed above by Nelson and Siegel 
(1987), being it equal to 
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
∑ 𝑒−𝑟(𝑡𝑗)𝑡𝑗𝑚𝑗=1 + 𝑒
−𝑟(𝑇𝑚)𝑇𝑚. What we are doing is 
finding the more accurate values for a, b, c and 𝛾 that minimize the error between the bonds 
market prices and the bond prices based on the rates that are estimated based on what is 
proposed by Nelson and Siegel (1987). Based on this it is necessary to define which type of 
bonds should be used to follow the optimization. As previously mentioned we pretend to use 
mortgage rates. As it is previously explained the model needs data on bonds with different 
maturities available in the market. We suggest using government/agency bonds such as the 
issued by Government Sponsored Enterprises, for example by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae, 
which are entities created with the objective to develop the home ownership in the USA.  
With the needed mortgage rate projection defined, we can focus on the weighted average 
coupon (WAC), which is a weighted average return that is paid by the collateral pool in each 
period. To make an accurate projection on this input it would be necessary to have more detailed 
information on the composition of the pool. We can use several ways to define the WAC level 
to be used. For simplification and when historical data on pool performance exists, it can be 
assumed that the WAC remains constant over time and equal to the last value that we have 
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information. We may also want to build a projection based on the pool consistency and on its 
characteristics- information available at Moody´s portal- for the following cases: being in the 
beginning of the product life, not having historical collateral performance, or in the case the 
product is not in the beginning, but we intend to perform a complex projection on WAC value. 
From our experience the mortgage payment can depend on Euribor plus a spread, if we can 
project the future Euribor rates and get a more accurate WAC forecast.  
With the WAC and mortgage projection created it is possible to reach a projection on the CPR 
for the following periods and consequently the unscheduled principal payments, and so 
reaching what should be a more accurate projection on what should be the total principal 
payment distribution adding the scheduled and the unscheduled.  
b) On the Coupon payment projection theme, we follow the Moody´s approach that is through 
a linear interpolation. If the coupon payment is a spread plus a rate performance, for instance 
the Euribor 3 months, the forecast for the next months is done using the 3 and 6 months Euribor. 
c) Call option which may affect the cash-flows distribution. Focusing on clean-up call options, 
a type that is very common in MBS, the issuer has the right to call back a security when it 
reaches a balance level below a threshold. They allow the issuer to clean this product from their 
balance sheet when market conditions are interesting but at the same time protect the investor 
as the threshold cannot be greater than 10%, as defined in Basel. Equally, this type of option is 
very useful to the issuer as it allows to eliminate the expenses of servicing a very small pool of 
loans. As mentioned in Fabozzi (2002), the collateral “quality” plays an important role, as 
different levels of collateral quality have associated different probabilities of credit-impairment 
or delinquency for market conditions faced. For instance, when exercising the option while still 
receiving payments from collateral the issuer may be put in a risk position as the collateral may 
default after the option exercise, and so the issuer would need to support the default. Based on 
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Fabozzi (2002) we suggest developing a probabilistic model to create a relationship between 
clean-up call exercise, securities collateral rating and market conditions.   
Also, it is necessary to understand under which market conditions a company may have interest 
in exercising an option. We define it as the rate difference between what companies can pay at 
period t and what were the rates at the product creation, being this difference subject to the need 
of being larger than the costs of going to markets again. To define what companies can be 
paying in the next periods we would need to project market rate. We suggest to do it using the 
Nelson and Siegel (1987) model and current market information on debt products with different 
rating. Following Lee et al. (1996) research, the bond issue has a total direct cost of 2.22% of 
the involved amount. Therefore, the rate available at product creation and the project rate would 
need to differ in at least 2.22%.  
Summing up, we consider an option will be exercised when fulfilling two conditions: the 
current balance is smaller than the defined threshold (at least 10%) of the original balance and 
when there is a difference of at least 2.22% between the interest rate at period t and period zero. 
Moreover, we should add the suggested probabilistic model to take into account the incentives 
to accelerate the option exercise that may exist depended on market and collateral conditions. 
Conclusion: We faced a difficulty to perform a test in real data due to the lack of information 
available, but we believe that with this rational method and using data available at Moody´s to 
update the regression behind the Richard and Roll (1989) model (consequently getting better 
CPR projection than what was found in section 4.2.2.1) we can project Mortgage Backed 
Securities returns and maturity more accurately than using the methods that are currently used 
by Moody´s providing investors with better tools to help them make their investment decisions. 
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4.3.2.2. Yield to Workout Date 
 
Valuable as it could be a better estimation due to call options, however it is highly 
dependable on the chosen date. 
Definition: 
Although not available in the portal, it is a popular metric in the industry. To understand it is 
essential to comprehend the workout date concept to comprehend the yield to workout metric. 
Workout date is the date that a bond is more likely to be called or redeemed taking into 
consideration the actual price, future expectations about the bond and the call schedule, that is, 
the list of dates a bond can be redeemed prior to the maturity and the corresponding prices by 
which it can be exercised.  
The yield to workout date is the expected return until the bond is expected to be called or 
redeemed (Marshall, 2000).  
Interpretation/Results: 
From the portal, we can get the yield for several different scenarios. For example, by forcing 
the call at a specific date, or letting it run until maturity. Although information/advice on the 
workout date is not available, this metric can be achieved using investors’ perspective on what 
is the workout date. Still, we would like Moody´s to use the suggestion on section “A new 
approach to project structured products returns” to add information on their expectations to call 
options exercise. 
To study this metric, random dates from 3, 6, 9, 12, 24 months apart were selected, and used as 
call dates. The objective was to see how yields varied for each case.  
- 52 - 
 
An expected and observed result is the increase in the yield as maturity increases, for a given 
price. In other words, as the period of time considered increases, there are consequently more 
cash flows to discount, implying a higher discount rate for a constant price of 100.  Another 
inference from this metric is the fact that returns can change a lot for small maturities 
differences.  
Concluding, when working with structured products, investors are highly exposed to the call 
option, and so the maturity date that was defined at the beginning may not correspond to the 
true one. This metric is a valuable mechanism to help investors as it can give a more accurate 
value of what should be the achieved return. However, the result is extremely volatile on date 
changes, making it highly dependent on the workout date, which is a simple perception of what 
is the most probable call date. Also, this metric has a problem since it does not account for 
prepayment across the product life. 
4.3.2.3. Yield to Call (YTC) 
 
Valuable as it provides the return on a bond with a call option embedded, which is very 
common with structured products. 
Definition: 
The yield to call is the return an investor requires to hold a callable bond bought at its market 
price and held until the next callable date, and it is computed using the yield to maturity formula 
but adjusting the maturity and consequently the cash flows distribution in this scenario. 
Interpretation/Results: 
This yield can be higher or lower than YTM, as when calculating this metric, it is assumed that 
the call will be exercised in the next possible date, independently if the product is being traded 
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at, in or out of the money.  Consequently, a lower yield than the YTM can be expected when 
the product is in the money, and a higher yield when the product is out of the money. 
This metric could be useful, since structured products do not usually run until maturity due to 
the call option, commonly exercised. Thus, this metric gives a more realistic return of what 
should be the true return when comparing to YTM. Similarly to the Yield to Workout Date, this 
metric does not account for the existence of prepayment. 
4.3.2.4. Yield to Worst (YTW) 
 
Valuable as it provides the return on a bond given the worst-case scenario. 
Definition: 
The yield to worst is the lowest yield that can be received between letting it simply run until 
maturity or force a call in the next possible date. Basically, it defines as the worst scenario the 
lowest yield case between receiving all the cash flows or be exposed as little time as possible 
to market uncertainty.  
It is a tool used to evaluate the worst-case scenario for the yield, helping investors to manage 
risk and to meet specific income requirements. For example, when a bond is callable or has 
other specific features, the yield to worst is the lowest of the previously mentioned yields (yield 
to maturity and yield to call). 
Interpretation/Results on the YTM, YTC and YTW: 
Applying the three concepts defined above to these metrics on the analysed tranches, we have 
observed that in several cases, the forced call would not have any effect on the yield of the 
bond. Supposedly, the holder of the bond would require a premium for the risk of having the 
bond called. One possible explanation for this is that there would be the fact that when 
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comparing the cash flow distribution of the two scenarios, assuming a constant price, there is 
no change in the yield received by the investor.  
However, we have also seen that in some cases the yield to maturity would be higher than the 
yield to call, being the latest the worst in this case. This might be explained by the fact that 
assuming a constant price when running until maturity we receive more interest payments than 
when the call is exercised, and consequently we will receive a higher yield. 
On the importance of the metrics, we conclude that these are of extreme importance, but may 
not be so relevant for some cases (in cases similar to the described in the second conclusion) 
and one needs to be extremely careful when analyzing and taking conclusions on these metrics 
individually, or even when comparing them. 
4.3.2.5. Yield to Maturity (YTM) 
 
Valuable as it is easy to calculate, to interpret and is used to price some products, but 
can lead to wrong inferences as most structured products do not usually reach maturity. 
Definition: 
 The Yield to Maturity is the rate of return that an investor buying a bond today at the market 
price earns, assuming the bond will be held until maturity and that all coupon payments are 
made. It can be interpreted as the total return earned by investors under the specified conditions. 
This relation is expressed as: 
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where ys is the annual YTM with compounding frequency s, c is the annual coupon rate with 
frequency n P is the principal payment, T are the coupon payment dates and t is the starting 
date. 
Interpretation/Results: 
As it was previously mentioned, most of these products do not reach maturity. Consequently, 
the importance of this metric is mostly related with its ease to calculate, and with the fact that 
it is widely used to price a lot of products. 
4.4. Risk measures 
 
Structured products depend on interest rate fluctuations, because its prices and coupons vary 
along all the time until maturity or the call. For investors in structured products it is very 
important to evaluate the risk of each security or tranche, riskier securities should require higher 
returns, so not only the interest rate fluctuations are important but also the changes in spread 
which is usually linked to the risk premium of the security. In order to provide better tools for 
Moody’s Analytics clients several metrics were analyzed and two were specially developed for 
their future needs (Effective Spread Duration and Effective Spread Convexity).  
4.4.1. Effective Spread convexity 
 
Valuable because it helps assess the change in bond prices in response to a change in 
spread only (excluding benchmarks’ changes), while also considering cash flow 
variability. 
Definition: 
Spread convexity is a measure of the non-linear relationship of bond prices to changes in spread, 
the second derivative of the price of the bond with respect to spread: 









𝑃(1 + 𝑟(0, 𝑡𝑖) + 𝑠)2
∑(𝑡2 + 𝑡)
𝐶𝐹𝑡




where 𝑃 is the Bond price, 𝑟(0, 𝑡𝑖) is the spot rate, s is the yield spread, and 𝐶𝐹𝑡 is the cash flow 
of period t. 
However, for bonds with an embedded option, it is not possible to consider convexity as a 
second derivative regarding variability of cash flows and value. Effective spread convexity is a 
metric specially developed by us for Moody’s in order to allow the investor to analyse the price 
sensitivity to spread changes (Note: The deduction of this metric will be explained in section 
4.4.3.1).  In order to study spread convexity, the Effective Spread Convexity was computed by 
us as an approximation, and not as the second derivative of bond’s price to the spread: 
Effective Spread Convexity =  
P+ + P− − 2 × P0
2 ∗ P0 × ∆spread2
 
where 𝑃0 is the bond's initial price, 𝑃− is the bond's price if its spread decreases, 𝑃+ is the bond's 
price if its spread increases ∆spread stands for the change in spread. 
The difference between spread convexity and effective spread convexity lies in the fact that the 
latter takes into consideration possible cash flows changes for spread movements, while the 
former simply assumes an unchanged cash flow distribution for yield changes. This can be seen 
in the formulas of the metrics: the spread convexity function is computed using the cash flows, 
when bond is run until maturity, while the effective spread convexity uses the price that arises 
from the spread change, letting the cash flows distribution change, if necessary, which is then 
reflected on the price. 
As mentioned by Fabozzi (2007), callable bonds may have negative effective convexity. This 
happens when the bond has more value for the issuer and a possibility to call it back is high, for 
instance when the rates fall the risk is higher, or when they increase the risk becomes lower. 
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Callable bonds are less sensitive to yield increases than to yield decreases, which creates 
negative convexity, as there is a change in the cash flows distribution that could overcome the 
interest change effect; whereas non-callable options are more sensitive to yield decreases than 
to yield increases. 
Interpretation/Results: 
This metric is not used by Moody’s so to calculate it, we encountered the same issues as with 
the Effective Spread Duration. Therefore, we could not vary the spread itself, and had to instead 
calculate the Effective Convexity – which would take into account a variation of the yield, not 
the spread. To calculate it, the prices were taken from the portal as for the Effective Duration.  
Analysing the values of the calculated Effective Convexity between different tranches over 
several deals, it is possible to conclude that more senior tranches have a lower Effective 
Convexity than junior ones, so its change in price will be lower. Bonds with lower convexity 
are less sensitive to changes in yield. Therefore, for the same change in spread, senior tranches 
have a lower change in prices, which makes them less sensitive to yield changes.  
Both Effective Spread Convexity and Effective Convexity can be valuable metrics, as they are 
important to take conclusions on different issues.  
On the one hand, Effective convexity considers the non-linear relation between prices and 
changes in yield, thus better capturing the sensitivity of the bond compared to the Effective 
Duration, and even better than simple Duration since it considers the cash flow variability. The 
practical results obtained led us to conclude that the more senior the tranche, the lower the 
convexity and thus the less sensitive to yield changes.  
On the other hand, while we could not calculate the Effective Spread Convexity, it would most 
likely be valuable because it would not only be an improvement to the Effective Spread 
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Duration as well (by considering non-linear relations as mentioned), but it would provide 
conclusions on how the price of the bond reacts to a change in the spread only, not including 
the possible changes in the index benchmark which would affect the yield. 
Effective spread convexity is not easy to understand for investors as effective spread duration 
or effective duration. However, it may be valuable as structured products are quoted at a specific 
spread, so this metric will allow investors to analyse price changes when higher changes in 
spread occur. Before including it in the portal, it is necessary to verify if all data for its 
calculation is available. 
4.4.2. Effective spread duration 
 
Valuable because it captures the change in price for a change in spread, while also 
taking into account cash flow structure. 
Definition: 
Effective spread duration is a metric specially developed by us for Moody’s in order to allow 
the investor analyse the price sensitivity to spread (Note: The deduction of this metric will be 
explained later in section 4.4.3.1). Effective spread duration is an estimate of how much the 
price of a specific bond will move when the spread of that bond changes. 
Effective Spread Duration =  
P− − P+
2 × P0 × ∆spread
 
where 𝑃0 is the bond's initial price, 𝑃− is the bond's price if its spread decreases, 𝑃+ is the bond's 
price if its spread increases ∆spread stands for the change in spread. 
Bonds with longer maturity have a larger effective spread duration. However, it will always be 
lower than the maturity of the bond. The interest rates have a high impact on the cash-flow 
structure of a bond with an embedded option, so duration or modified duration, which do not 
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take this into account cash flow and value changes, are not a relevant measure of bond 
sensitivity to yield changes for this type of complex products. 
Interpretation/Results: 
Moody’s does not use it, as the Moody’s portal allows us to get the price fluctuation associated 
to yield change at a given price level. So, to assess the impact of effective spread duration, we 
considered an initial price of 100 and the respective yield, and then increased and decreased the 
initial yield by adding 0,5 percentage points to get the respective prices. Due to its limitations, 
it was not possible to vary just the spread, so only a total variation of yield was performed. This 
ultimately corresponds to the Effective Duration, therefore no conclusions on the application 
and practical results of the Effective Spread Duration could be taken. 
However, in theoretical terms, this metric could add value since when working with structured 
products that usually have a floating component, the term discount margin is frequently used, 
which simply corresponds to the spread over the benchmark index, such that 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐷𝑀 + 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘. Consequently, Effective spread duration is 
theoretically an interesting metric as it allows the spot rate to adjust (following the change in 
cash flows’ structure), while also just focusing on the spread component, to try to see how the 
price fluctuates with a spread change. Meanwhile, the normal effective duration looks to the 
whole shift of the yield, without specifying if the change originates in the spread or in the 
benchmark index.      
Mathematically speaking, 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 
∆Yield =  ∆spot rate +  ∆spread 
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Effective spread duration may be valuable for investors as structured products are quoted at a 
specific spread, and may be easier to understand price sensitivity to changes in spread, although 
before including it in the portal it is necessary to verify if all data for its calculation is available. 
Effective Spread Duration is equally valuable for investors, when small changes in spread as 
considered, although for higher changes in spread it is better to analyse Effective Spread 
Convexity. 
4.4.3.  Effective Duration 
 
Valuable because it shows the bond’s sensitivity to yield changes, given the options and 
cash flow variability that could happen with a yield change. 
Definition: 
As mentioned by Fabozzi (2007), Effective duration shows the expected price change for a 
bond when yield rises by 1%. It is a measure of interest rate risk of a bond. This type of duration 
is particularly important for bonds that have embedded options, because in this case modified 
duration is not accurate due to the possibility of variability of cash flows and bond value. By 
considering the prices and the changes when the yield moves, it is assumed that the structure of 
the cash flows (which in this type of products is commonly not the same as the structure when 
the bond runs to maturity) is captured and reflected in the price. 
Effective Duration =  
P−−P+
2×P0×∆𝑌
  (CFA, 2015) 
where 𝑃0  is the bond's initial price, 𝑃− the bond's price if its yield decreases, 𝑃+the bond's price 
if its yield increases and ∆𝑌is the change in yield.  
Bonds with a longer maturity have a larger effective duration. However, it will always be lower 
than the maturity of the bond. Interest rates have a high impact on the cash-flow structure of a 
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bond with an embedded option, so duration or modified duration are not the most appropriate 
measures of bond sensitivity to yield changes.  
Interpretation/Results: 
As this metric is not used by Moody’s, but Moody´s structured products portal allows us to get 
this metric as it gives the price fluctuation associated to yield change at a given price level. So, 
the same procedure as followed in effective spread duration was taken to get the prices from 
Moody’s structured products portal. In the analysed deals, the effective duration was always 
lower than its maturity. However, the deal with the highest maturity was not the one with the 
highest effective duration.  
Analysing the values of effective duration between different tranches over several deals, it is 
possible to conclude that more senior tranches have a lower effective duration than junior ones, 
hence its change in price will be lower. Additionally, for the same change in yield, senior 
tranches have lower changes in prices, which makes them less sensitive to yield changes. 
Effective Duration is a better measure of price sensitivity than Duration or Modified Duration 
because it considers the changes in cash flows and value, which might occur when we have a 
bond that has an embedded option, cash flows that change when interest rates change resulting 
from prepayments and the exercising of calls. (Fabozzi, 2007) 
As other types of durations, effective duration is easier for investors to understand price 
sensitivity to yield changes; considering this, we believe it should be included in the Moody’s 
structured products portal. Additionally, this metric may be useful to compare price sensitivity 
of any structured product to a straight bond, as in straight bonds price sensitivity is measured 
by changes in yield. 
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4.4.3.1. Effective Spread Duration and Effective Spread Convexity ( Lilia 
Chemetova Individual report) 
 
Interest rate risk is a type of risk that exist in assets, which price depends on fluctuations of 
interest rates. On investor’s decision-making process, it is very important to know how the 
asset’s price will vary with interest rates changes, to evaluate how risky the asset is. Bonds are 
the securities that depend the most on changes in interest rates and have a particularity: there 
exists an inverse relationship between bond prices and yields. 
In order to easily understand the interdependence between bond price changes and from interest 
rate fluctuations, there exist metrics such as Macaulay Duration or Convexity. Duration 
measures the percentage change in the market value of a bond for a given change in yield, when 
small changes in yield are considered, once in higher changes in interest rates, duration can 
overestimate or underestimate the price approximation (Dunetz and Mahoney, 1988). 
Convexity is more useful for higher changes in yield, but we should be more careful since it is 
the curvature of the price-yield function.  
However, for structured products it is not possible to use these metrics to evaluate their 
sensitivity to yield changes. Since for callable bonds it is almost impossible to have any 
certainty regarding the cash flows and value, as mentioned previously these securities are not 
hold until maturity and have other risks associated like prepayment risk, reinvestment risk. 
In case of these complex products, metrics as Effective Duration or Effective Convexity are 
used, because they capture cash flow variations and reflect them in respective prices. Effective 
Duration shows the expected price change for a bond when yield rises by 1%. In callable bonds, 
when interest rates are low comparing to coupon and a call option is in the money, then it is 
more likely to be called and so callable bond’s Effective Duration is reduced. Effective 
Convexity is also a good measure of bond’s price sensitivity to interest rate changes, as this 
relationship is not linear.  For high interest rates, it is almost impossible for the callable bond 
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to be exercised so its sensitivity to interest rate changes is similar to a straight bond. However, 
there is a particularity with these products, they may have a negative convexity. Effective 
convexity turns negative when options value is close to in the money, so when interest rates 
decline the bond value is capped by the price of the call option if it is near the exercise date. 
More specifically, most MBS have negative convexity because the mortgage borrowers can 
prepay their loans. As interest rates fall, the incentive to prepay increases, generally resulting 
in an increase in prepayments to MBS holders. This effect causes the duration of MBS to fall 
as interest rates decline (Gagnon et al., 2011). During the last years MBS market has become 
more negatively convex. This particularity has resulted from the huge market growth, advances 
in information technology and enhanced competition in mortgage banking (reduction of 
refinancing costs) (Hanson, 2014). Callable bonds are less sensitive to interest rate increases 
than to interest rate decreases, which creates negative convexity – price appreciation is less than 
price decline when huge changes in rates occur; whereas non-callable bonds are more sensitive 
to interest rate decreases than to interest rate increases.  
For investors in structured products it very important to consider not only the yield of the 
security but the spread over the benchmark index as well. The reasoning behind the heightened 
importance of this spread comes from the fact that different spreads are commonly used in 
valuation of these product. For instance, MBS, ABS and CDO are traded at nominal yield 
spread, Discount Margin, Z-spread, or even OAS when they have embedded options (Nielsen, 
2017). When these products have a floating component, discount margin is a frequently used 
concept, which corresponds to the spread over the benchmark index, expressed as 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐷𝑀 + 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘, usually in this products with floating component 
Moody’s compute the yield to maturity by estimation considering that it is run until maturity. 
Assuming there are many different types of spread used to explain price fluctuations of these 
securities, it could be interesting to provide the investor a different tool to evaluate risk of 
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structured products. Measure as spread duration was already proposed by Fabozzi (1999), 
although it is not guaranteed its usefulness for structured products. For this reason, two different 
metrics, effective spread duration and effective spread convexity, were specially developed for 
Moody’s Analytics. The purpose of these metrics is to evaluate price sensitivity to a change in 
spread, assuming there is no change in reference rate. In these metrics any specific spread will 
not be considered. Therefore, in order to make it easier to understand price sensitivity to 
changes in spread, a more general expression will be considered. Mathematically speaking, the 
change in yield will be represented as: 
Yield = reference rate + spread 
∆Yield =  ∆reference rate +  ∆spread 
The Effective Spread Duration and Effective Spread Convexity expressions derive from the 
original formulas where yield is the independent variable.  
Effective Duration =  
P−−P+
2×P0×∆𝑌
 (CFA, 2015) 
Effective Convexity =  
P++P−−2∗P0
2×P0×∆𝑌2
 (CFA, 2015) 
where 𝑃0  is the bond's initial price, 𝑃− the bond's price if its yield decreases, 𝑃+the bond's price 
if its yield increases and ∆𝑌 is the change in yield.  
So, to get the respective expressions a simple substitution was made according to previous 
assumptions about yield.  
Effective Spread Duration =  
P− − P+
2 × P0 × ∆spread
 
Effective Spread Convexity =  
P+ + P− − 2 × P0
2 ∗ P0 × ∆spread2
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where 𝑃0 is the bond's initial price, 𝑃− is the bond's price if its spread decreases, 𝑃+ is the bond's 
price if its spread increases ∆spread stands for the change in spread. 
Assuming there is no change in the reference rate, ∆𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 0, it will be possible to 
study price sensitivity accordingly just to spread changes. Effective Spread Duration and 
Effective Spread Convexity would be very useful metrics for investors, since they will be able 
to analyze risk based on spread between different securities. 
For instance, considering a random chosen spot rates and spread, for a 4% coupon bond, face 
value of 100, a spread of 0,12% and applying an increase/decrease in spread of 0.1%: 








1 + 4.09% + 0.12%
+
4
(1 + 5.54% + 0.12%)2
+
4
(1 + 6.03% + 0.12%)3
+
104




1 + 4.09% + 0.22%
+
4
(1 + 5.54% + 0.22%)2
+
4
(1 + 6.03% + 0.22%)3
+
104




1 + 4.09% + 0.02%
+
4
(1 + 5.54% + 0.02%)2
+
4
(1 + 6.03% + 0.02%)3
+
104
(1 + 7.55% + 0.02%)4
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The following prices were obtained: the initial price of this bond, P0, is 88,15%, then varying 
the spread of it, increasing by 0.1% the price, P+, will be 87,84%. and decreasing by 0.1% the 
price, P− will be 88,46%. Then applying previously obtained formulas I get: 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
88.46% − 87.84%
2 × 88.15% × 0.1
= 3.49 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
88.46% + 87.84% − 2 ∗ 88.15%
2 × 88.15% × (0.1%)2
= 7.92 
Note: just the change in spread was considered as the reference rates remain constant. 
It is possible to interpret that a duration of 3.49 represents an approximate change in price of 
3.49% for a 100bp change in spread. Supposing that there is a change in spread of 200bp for 
the previously mentioned hypothetical bond, and the duration adjustment is given by 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  −𝐷 × ∆𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 × 100, then the duration adjustment for a 
∆spread=0.02 will be is 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  −3.49 × 0.02 × 100 = −6.97. 
On the other hand, when considering a change in spread of 200bp for the previously mentioned 
hypothetical bond, where the convexity adjustment is given 
by 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  𝐶 × ∆𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑2 × 100, then the convexity adjustment 
for a ∆spread=0.02 will be  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  7.92 × 0.022 × 100 = 0.32. 
Finally, considering the impact on the bond price is given by
∆𝑃
𝑃
= −𝐷 × ∆𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 +
∆𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑2
2
× 𝐶, so 
∆𝑃
𝑃
= −3.49 × 0.02 +
0.022
2
× 7.92 = 0.07. 
The main advantage of the developed metrics is that they look at changes originated in the 
spread, whereas the normal Effective Duration and Effective Convexity look only to the whole 
shift of the yield. 
Similarly to Effective Duration, Effective Spread Duration can be easier for investors to 
understand because it will show the expected price change for a bond when spread changes, 
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which is relevant for small changes. Although Effective Spread Convexity is not so simple to 
interpret as Effective Spread Duration, it could be relevant as it is a more accurate metric to 
describe price sensitivity to higher changes in spread. So, a more deepen study must be done in 
order to understand how useful Effective Spread Duration and Effective Spread Convexity are 
as risk measures for investor in structured products. Thus, for investors in structured products 
these metrics can be interesting to analyse when there is available information regarding spread 
used for trading purposes. 
4.4.4.  Partial Duration 
 
Valuable since it allows for a more detailed analysis of market risk. 
Definition: 
While Duration measures the sensitivity of the price to changes in the Yield curve, Partial 
Duration measures the sensitivity of the price for changes in a specific maturity in the Yield 
Curve. It is calculated as:  
Bond Price after a 1% decrease in a specific maturity − Bond Price after a 1% increase in a specific maturity
2 × 1% × 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 
This metrics was suggested by Moody’s Analytics and we believe it should be added to the SF 
Portal. 
Interpretation/Results: 
Unlike Modified Duration, this allows to check the sensitivity of the product in specific 
maturities and not in all at the same time (vertical shifts in the curve). This allows investors to 
know in more detail to what risks they are being exposed to – the maturities of cash-flows with 
higher partial duration are the ones that expose the product the most. The metric can also be 
used between different products to know which are the most sensible to a specific maturity. 
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4.4.5. Implied Volatility 
 
Could be valuable because it represents the market expected fluctuations of the option. 
Definition: 
It is the estimated volatility of an option's price. It is a method used to estimate the future 
fluctuations of an option's value considering certain predictive factors. 
Implied volatility is different from historical volatility, which represents the realized returns, 
measuring past changes of market performance. When the two measures have similar values, 
options premiums are generally considered to be fairly valued. 
Implied volatility changes according to investors expectation, so it tends to be higher when 
investors expect a decrease in the option’s price over time, and lower when investors expect an 
increase in the option’s price over time. 
There are some factors that affect implied volatility such as supply and demand of a security, 
and time value of the option. Higher demand rises the price and so does implied volatility, 
which leads to a higher option premium, due to the risky nature of the option. 
Additionally, maturity should be considered, so an option with longer maturity tends to have a 
higher implied volatility than an option with shorter maturity, since time is an additional 
variable and a longer period of time is considered into the option (Martellini et al., 2003). 
Interpretation/Results: 
In theory, this metric could be useful as it represents the market expected fluctuations embedded 
in the security price, and consequently may help investors making decisions as they can adjust 
their expectations considering the market’s. However, to estimate, it would require considering 
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option pricing models as Black-Scholes or Binomial Model, that due to characteristics of 
analysed products are difficult to be applied.  
4.4.6. Standard Deviation/Volatility 
 
Valuable since it is the simplest measure of volatility and can be used as input for other 
metrics or models. 
Definition: 
Although a commonly used metric in Finance, this was not present in the Structured Finance 
Portal, hence we were suggested to calculate it.  
When working with Bonds this measure is less reliable since, by definition, the bond price will 
converge to its Face Value. Therefore, we apply this method to the returns of a Zero-Coupon 
Bond calculated through the respective spot rates of the bond’s coupons, as in decomposing a 
coupon bond in many zero-coupon bonds, and calculate the value for the whole bond through 
the following matrix multiplication: √𝑤′∑𝑤, where ∑ is the variance-covariance matrix of the 
spot rates and 𝑤 is a column vector with the weights of the present values of the coupons on 
the price of the bond. 
A problem that may arise is not having matching coupon’s maturities and spot rates, which 
leads to problems when calculating the 𝑤 vector. Hence, we can use “Volatility Bucketing”, that 
is, having a “bucket” corresponding to each spot rate in the 𝑤 vector and partly assign the present 
value of the coupons to the buckets with the closest maturities. This way, when a coupon’s 
maturity falls between two spot rates, we split it between the bucket with the closest maturity 
on the downside and the upside: 
𝑤1
2𝜎1
2 + (1 − 𝑤1)
2𝜎2
2  + 2𝑤1(1 − 𝑤1)𝜎1,2 =   𝜎𝑘
2, 
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where 𝑤1 is the weight given to the bucket with lower maturity (the remaining goes to the 
bucket with higher maturity); 𝜎1
2, the variance of the lower bucket; 𝜎2
2, the variance of the 
higher bucket; 𝜎1,2,  the covariance between buckets; and 𝜎𝑘
2 is the variance got from 
interpolating the other two variances in respect the cash-flow’s maturity. This formula comes 
from the fact that: 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑎𝑋 + 𝑏𝑌) =  𝑎2𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑋) +  𝑏2𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑌) +
2𝑎𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑋, 𝑌). 
Interpretation/Results: 
The Standard Deviation is the most basic way to measure the market risk that may arise from 
changes in the relevant interest rates. It can be applied to the product to get its overall risk, but 
also to specific components of the product. For example, by looking to specific interest rates 
we can find for which maturities and respective cash-flows the product is the most sensitive to. 
This metric is also used as an input for other metrics and relevant computations (VaR, Pricing 
Options…). 
One negative observation about this metric is the fact that it was calculated with historical data, 
which may not be the best to predict the future. However, there are more sophisticated models 
that can be applied (GARCH, EGARCH, EWMA…), but require information that may not be 
available for this kind of products. The standard deviation calculated also considered the 
correlation between interest rates regarding different maturities, which can underestimate the 
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4.4.7. Value at Risk 
 
Valuable to show the monetary value of possible losses and the minimum loss that can 
be expected α% of the times. 
Definition: 
As defined in Jorion (2001), “Value-at-Risk estimates how much a set of investments might 
lose, given normal market conditions, in a set time period such as a day. p VaR is defined such 
that the probability of a loss greater than VaR is less than or equal to p; while the probability of 
a loss less than VaR is less than or equal to 1−p. For a given portfolio, time horizon, 
and probability p, the p VaR can be defined informally as the maximum possible loss during 
the time if we exclude worse outcomes whose probability is less than p.” 
VaR can be estimated either parametrically (for example, variance-covariance VaR or delta-
gamma VaR) or non-parametrically (for example, through historical simulation VaR or Monte 
Carlo VaR). The approach taken was the variance-covariance one.  
From the daily standard deviations and the market values calculated as described in Standard 
Deviation, we were able to calculate the daily VaR at a 95% and 99% confidence level. The 
formula is:  
𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑅 @ 99% =  − 𝜎𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 ∗ 𝑍1% ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
where 𝑍1% is the critical value from the cumulative standardized normal distribution for the 1% 
level. For the VaR at 95% confidence level, this critical value was computed for the 5% level. 
Interpretation/Results: 
The value is interpreted as follows: there is a 5% probability that the portfolio will fall in value 
by more than £ 107 067,25 over a one-day period. Informally, a loss of £ 107 067,25 or more 
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is expected in 1 out of 20 days. For the daily VaR @ 99%, there is a 1% probability it will fall 
by more than £ 151 427,26 over a one-day period, and this is the minimum loss expected in 1 
out of 100 days.  
This metric is important and relevant for investors, and would be interesting to be included in 
the portal, because by taking into account the value of the product or position, it shows the 
monetary value of a possible loss, as well as the loss that can be expected 1%/5%/… of the 
times. It is also useful because it can be adjusted according to the level of confidence and time 
frequency (daily, monthly…). 
4.4.8. Expected Shortfall 
 
Could be valuable and more useful than VaR, as it gives the expected (average) loss of 
the portfolio α% of the times. 
Definition: (Hull, 2015) 
The Expected Shortfall (or Conditional VaR) at α% level is the expected return of the portfolio 
in the worst α% of cases. That is, the expected loss of the portfolio value assuming a loss is 
occurring at or below the α-quantile. CVaR is calculated as the weighted average between 
the value at risk and losses exceeding the value at risk. To calculate it, the most common 
procedure is to estimate it non-parametrically, through Monte Carlo simulations. 
Interpretation/Results: 
For an α of 5%, the ES at a 5% level of confidence is the expected loss in the worst 5% of cases. 
The metric can be valuable, especially when confronted with the VaR, because it provides the 
average expected loss of the worst cases whilst the VaR only provides the threshold at which 
the worst cases start (thus being the ‘best case’ of the worst cases). This metric is not provided 
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in the portal yet, and could be an interesting addition if a solid model to calculate it could be 
developed. 
4.4.8.1. A Deeper Look into VaR and ES (Daniela Santos Individual Report) 
 
Value-at-Risk, as discussed previously, can be a valuable metric to represent the loss that will 
not be exceeded with an α% confidence level, in a certain amount of time. That is, if the monthly 
99% VaR is $1M, losses in a month will exceed this with only a 1% chance. The interpretation 
is straight-forward and intuitive, thus causing it to be a very popular, widely used, valuable tool 
for financial risk management. However, it also has some inherent disadvantages.  
First of all, by definition, VaR ignores what can happen in (following the example above) 1% 
of the cases: it only tells investors what is the minimum loss that will occur 1 out of 100 of the 
times – it is the best of the worst cases, and any loss beyond the VaR level is disregarded. Two 
portfolios with identical VaRs could have extremely different levels of risk beyond the 
threshold, and that would not be reflected in the metric at all. The left tail of the distribution is 
simply ignored, meaning there is ‘tail risk’ (Artzner et all, 1997). As a result, there can be an 
underestimation of the risk, with large unexpected losses. In fact, extreme events, in the form 
of leptokurtosis (‘fat tails’), can occur much more commonly than what is assumed by Gaussian 
models.  
Additionally, VaR is not sub-additive, as was formally proven by Acerbi and Tasche (2002). 
This property implies that “a portfolio made of sub-portfolios will risk an amount which is at 
most the sum of the separate amounts risked by its sub-portfolios”. In other words, breaking 
this axiom means the sum of the individual assets’ VaR is not necessarily higher than the VaR 
of a portfolio containing all the same assets. For this reason, the authors consider VaR not to be 
a risk measure in essence, since joining portfolios and assets results in diversification, and the 
risk, as assessed by the metric, ought to be no higher than the partial portfolios and assets’ risk. 
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The implications of not being sub-additive are quite significant: not only does this mean that 
the portfolio VaR would have to be recalculated each time a new asset is introduced or removed 
from the portfolio (Darbha, 2001), but also that simply summing individual VaRs may in fact 
lead to a misleadingly conservative estimate of the level of risk. The latter is not a disadvantage 
in itself; however, it can be undesirable for financial institutions determining risk weights and 
buffers based on that VaR value, because the level of collateral needed to back that risk will be 
higher, and capital will be ‘tied up’ unnecessarily. 
In terms of calculations, the VaR of a stock or portfolio of stocks can be estimated through three 
main approaches: historical simulation, parametrically (variance-covariance VaR), or Monte 
Carlo simulation. While each method has its merits, they also present drawbacks. Historical 
simulation looks only at historical data to model potential future movements, thus assuming the 
past is the best indicator of what will happen in the future. Parametric VaR, while the most 
appropriate for a portfolio because it can correct for the fact that VaR is not sub-additive, must 
be calculated using a return distribution, usually the normal, therefore not taking into account 
kurtosis and skewness. Forward-looking simulations such as Monte Carlo are the preferred 
approach because it can be tailored to the products (which is particularly important considering 
the type of products we are focusing on), however doing this properly is extremely costly and 
requires a lot of time. From this, we can conclude that while the metric itself is extremely 
valuable, a simple number cannot be trusted completely given the difficulty in finding a way to 
calculate it as accurately as possible. 
Nevertheless, the most common approach is to calculate VaR parametrically – particularly, the 
variance-covariance VaR. However, while it is relatively straight-forward to compute for a 
portfolio of stocks (historical returns can be used to compute their standard deviation and 
covariance), for a fixed income portfolio the calculations become trickier. By using the 
historical returns of a bond directly, VaR would be overestimated because of the ‘pull-to-par’ 
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effect in bonds: since as maturity gets closer, the price of the bond converges to par, the 
volatility of returns varies for different points in time depending on the maturity considered, 
decreasing as maturity is approaching. (Beleza Sousa et al., 2014).  
To overcome this issue, the typical approach (and the approach we followed) is Cash Flow 
Mapping, which involves treating each cash flow – coupon payments and principal repayment 
–, as individual zero-coupon bonds, and using the available historical yields for each standard 
maturity. Nevertheless, it is important to note that studies such as Fernandes (2014) have 
concluded this method greatly underestimates the bond VaR of a portfolio, with incurred losses 
larger than the forecasted through the model. 
Another possibility is the Pull Price method, which, unlike the CF mapping approach, is not 
dependent on having the relevant historical yields. However, it is constructed under the 
assumption that yields to maturity are a good measure of return, incorporating interest rate, 
credit and liquidity risks (Fernandes, 2014). Thus, under this standard definition, Pull Price 
cannot be applied correctly to structured products. As explained previously, yield to maturity 
is not an accurate return measure for structured products, given the fundamental characteristic 
of them being callable, causing a very high percentage of these products to not reach maturity. 
The alternative would be using the yield to call, which denotes the return considering only the 
cash flows until the next callable date.  
A specific example of a model that could be developed further under the scope of structured 
products is a method introduced by Beleza Sousa et al. (2014), involving individual maturity 
adjustments and removing the ‘pull to par’ effect from the bond’s past prices. By computing 
Adjusted Historical Returns (AHR), the VaR can then be computed similarly to stocks. For 
each historical price, it is necessary to take the implied yield to maturity (the suggested adapted 
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where T is the maturity (a proposed alteration is using the workout date, instead of the ‘official’ 
maturity of the product), P is the cashflow (this simplified example only considers the principal 
repayment), and n is the point in time of the historical price. The pulled price to time nVaR, the 
point in which we are computing VaR (as an example, to calculate the 10-day VaR, we would 
need to calculate the AHR between dates 10 trading days apart), is between n and T, and given 
























 ; n = N + 1, …,nVaR ; and N corresponding to the time horizon 
considered for the VaR (e.g. N=10 for a 10-day VaR). With these Adjusted Historical Returns, 
the VaR can be computed through the same methods as for stocks, by calculating the potential 
loss of the 1-α quantile of the bond’s specific adjusted empirical distribution of returns. (All the 
equations regarding this model were taken from Beleza Sousa et al., 2014).  
However, there are still limitations to this approach when applied to structured products, despite 
the suggested modifications. The main one is the difficulty in finding prices. In a prices sample 
provided by Moody’s, there were days with more than one price (corresponding to more than 
one deal having taken place that day), and several days with no information at all. In addition, 
the prices were only available until 2015, despite the deal still being ‘alive’. While this is 
expectable given that the products are being traded OTC, and not on a ‘traditional’ stock 
exchange, it complicates the calculations of risk measures such as VaR.  
Still, these type of risk metrics are important not only at the individual institution’s level (for 
internal risk management), but also at a regulatory level, particularly for collateral 
determination. VaR used to be the metric chosen in the Basel Accords to be the basis for capital 
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requirements calculations; however, in the revised versions, the risk measure was updated to 
reflect the Expected Shortfall (ES).  
Also known as Conditional VaR (since it is the ‘conditional expectation of loss given that the 
loss is beyond the VaR level’ – International Monetary Fund, 2007), ES denotes the average 
loss in the α% of the cases, to which VaR only sets the threshold. Moreover, unlike VaR, it is 
indeed a coherent risk measure (Acerbi & Tasche, 2002), by being provably sub-additive 
(Acerbi, Nordio, & Sirtori, 2001). In addition, by working with averages in the lower quantiles 
of the distribution, it corrects for the ‘fat tails’ problem inherent to VaR, which would result in 
large losses beyond the VaR level, unaccounted for in terms of capital. This is one of the reasons 
regulation has been updated to replace VaR with ES. As a result, banks must now calibrate the 
ES to periods of significant market stress, in order to maintain adequate capital during those 
periods (PWC, 2017). 
Regarding its calculation, if we follow the proposed Adjusted Pull Price method described 
previously, the computation of ES is straightforward, and does not require any additional 
computational effort. Having the product’s returns distribution, ES can be calculated, for 
example, through Monte Carlo simulation, or it can even be taken directly from the historical 
simulation, where we simply compute the mean of the α% worst results. 
All in all, Value-at-Risk is an essential, widely used metric for risk management. However, it 
does have some drawbacks, especially when it comes to ignoring what happens beyond the 
computed VaR level. For that reason, Expected Shortfall is currently starting to replace it as a 
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4.4.9. DV01 to Worst ($ per 100bps yield change) 
 
Valuable as it allows investors to infer in dollar terms what would be their exposition to 
interest changes in the worst scenario and so adjust hedge strategies to the worst 
scenario. 
Definition: 
DV01($ per 100bps yield change) is a metric that is widely used by financial markets 
participants. It is the monetary variation in the case of 100 basis points change of interest rate, 
being an interest rate risk metric, as it tells the how much money the security value will change 
for a percentage point change. It is computed through the following formula: 










Where P is referent to the security price function and r to interest rate. It is necessary to divide 
the dollar duration by 100 (since modified duration is expressed as a 100% change, a unitary 
price movement, and DV01 ($ per 100bps yield change) is referring to a percentage point 
change). 
The worst-case scenario was defined as the one with the smallest yield between the case the 
investor does not receive all interest (so if the call is exercised in the next callable date), and 
the case where the security runs until maturity. Consequently, DV01 to Worst, which is an 
adaptation from DV01, will refer to the monetary variation a security is exposed to in the worst 
scenario per a percentage point change.  
DV01 is very convenient to produce analysis, as it allows hedge strategies to be developed 
(which is not possible using duration, as it delivers a value in percentage terms).  
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Interpretation/Results: 
In the conducted analysis we observed, as expected, that senior tranches were less exposed to 
interest fluctuation, which was matched with a lower yield. Thus, senior tranches presented a 
smaller DV01 to worst when compared to more junior tranches.  
This metric in particular is useful, as structured products’ life and payments could differ a lot 
from the pre-defined maturity, due to its call and prepayment option.  As explained before, this 
metric allows for hedging – a general characteristic of DV01 –, but DV01 to worst is 
particularly beneficial as it allows to take conclusions and adjust hedge strategies to the worst 
scenario.  
Moody´s structured products portal allows us to get this metric as it gives the price fluctuation 
associated to yield change at a given price level. However, this is not directly given. We believe 
Moody´s should add this metric. 
4.4.9.1. DV01 as a Hedging Tool (Sofia Oliveira Individual Report) 
The case for the U.S. Treasuries Curve 
This subchapter aims at exploring the concept of DV01, described in the metrics’ section, and 
to apply it to an investment decision process as a hedging tool. The last part provides a practical 
example for this concept applied to the U.S. Treasuries Curve. 
As previously mentioned DV01 ($ per 1bps yield change) is the dollar value of 0.01% and gives 
the change in the value of a fixed income security for a 1 basis point decline in interest rates 
(Tuckman and Serrat, 2012). This metric is widely used in financial markets and it is extremely 
valuable mainly because it allows investors to determine in dollar terms what would their 
exposition be to changes in interest rates. Moreover, as highlighted in both DV01 to next call 
and DV01 to worst, DV01 is very convenient for analysis purposes, as it allows hedge strategies 
to be developed, and when there is not a closed form for duration, as for the case of callable 
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bonds mentioned in the early sections of this report.. This section will focus on this particularity 
of DV01, using the concept as the baseline to build hedged spreads in the U.S. Treasuries curve. 
Introduction: Every investment requires a risk-return analysis, and the relation will always 
depend on a predefined set of inputs that vary from investor to investor. These include the risk 
appetite or risk aversion, the investment horizon and the disposable amount to invest. However, 
there is something common to (almost) every investor which is the desire to make returns at the 
lowest, and if possible, at no risk. In any case, the portfolio should be always adjusted to the 
desired level of risk. Since ceasing the investment activities is not an option in most cases, 
hedging is widely used strategies to achieve the desired level of risk. 
At this section, DV01 will be exemplified as a hedging tool for part of the U.S. Treasuries 
Curve. The set of assumptions for the model include the following: 
• Only future contracts are considered; 
• DV01 is the only factor that leads to different amplitude movements in the different 
contracts; 
• Floaters are not considered in this analysis. 
The U.S. Treasuries Curve: The fixed income market comprises thousands of different 
securities from every part of the world. Within the most famous are the financial products that 
form the US Treasuries Curve. The curve is composed by contracts made with the US 
government, either as the borrowing or the lending party. These contracts have different 
maturities that when sequentially and timely organized constitute the curve. In simple terms, if 
an investor buys a 2-Year Treasury contract, she is lending money to the US government, and 
will be repaid the face value of the loan at maturity, in this specific example, after the two-year 
period. This would be an active contract. For trading purposes, futures on Treasuries are more 
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commonly used as these are more liquid and easily used as the baseline for a trading strategy. 
The remaining parts of the U.S. curve include contracts that have maturities from one month to 
thirty years. 
The main idea of using DV01 as a hedging tool applied to the US Treasury curve is simply to 
find a fair value, and being able to determine which parts of the curve are overvalued and 
undervalued. The first would trigger a sell signal and the latter would trigger a buy signal. These 
would ideally lead to more active trades on the contracts and with more confidence, assuming 
that the contracts will return to their fair value, whenever there is a deviation. 
The Fair Value: At this point, it is important to introduce the hedging concept and the fair 
value idea. A fully hedged investor will make no profit whenever there are price movements on 
the securities traded. Basically, this investor would gain (lose) on one side and lose (gain) on 
the other the same amount. The fair value is the price at which the security or strategy (when 
referring to more than one security) should be trading, considering a set of assumptions. This 
practical case considers DV01 as the baseline for the fair value. More specifically, for every 
combination of two or more fixed income products, DV01 will be the main tool to decide which 
weight each of the securities will have in the strategy. An important assumption is that a security 
with a higher DV01 is riskier and should react more to events, thus to become fully hedged in 
terms of DV01 risk, a higher weight should be assign to the other leg. This relation is further 
explained and exemplified. 
Methodology and Application: Applying the concept to the US Treasury Curve, there are 
several ways of combining every product with each other in strategies of two. By simply 
combining these securities into spreads and considering a 1:1 ratio, the investor would be 
exposed, as the two legs involved are impacted differently by events. Therefore, the weight in 
each leg should be carefully considered to account for this difference and this would be 
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ultimately reflected in the number of contracts, or the ratio for each leg to buy (long) the 
position. This is necessary because the curve includes contracts with different maturities that 
cover periods from six months to approximately 30 years. There are two important facts to 
consider on this point. The first is that different maturities imply different DV01 values and 
when carrying a two leg strategy where one of the positions has higher DV01, it also has more 
risk and in theory have larger movements to changes in interest rates than the lower DV01 leg. 
The second point is that short-term securities are usually more impacted than longer term. This 
is because a longer time to maturity implies more uncertainty and more time for the markets to 
incorporate the new information given by the event that led to the movement. This section will 
focus on the first point. 
In every spread of US Treasuries, there will be the lower and higher DV01 leg. To make the 
strategy tradable, the number of contracts for each leg should be defined such that the investor 
is fully hedged in terms of DV01. In other words, any movement in the market should return a 
Profit and Loss of zero. This would be the fair value. Any deviation from this would trigger a 
signal that would allow the holder to profit from the strategy. 
Having now a clear understanding about all the inputs and concepts, the ratios would be simply 
the minimum tradable ratios that would maintain the DV01 relationship between the two 
components of the spread. The image below shows the DV01 hedging ratios for the 2-year, 5-
year, 10-year and 30-year Treasuries futures considered in this example, extracted from a 
Bloomberg terminal. All the contracts are March 2018 futures. 
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Assuming a hypothetical strategy, being the spread between the 5-Year Treasury March 2018 
future (leg 1, FVH8) and the 10-Year Treasury future for the same month (leg 2, TYH8), 1 unit 
of DV01 of leg 1 is to 0.625 units of DV01 of leg 2, or as it can be seen from the matrix above, 
1 unit of leg 2 is to 1.6 of leg 1. In other words, if one buys one 5-year future, she should also 
sell (short) 0.625 contracts of the 10-year future contract to become DV01 hedged. 
As previously mentioned, this relation makes sense because the higher DV01 leg is riskier, thus 
is expected to move more that the lower DV01 leg. To compensate for these larger movements, 
a higher weight should be considered for the latter, In order to replicate the higher amplitude of 
movements expected for the higher DV01 leg, in this case, the 10-Year Treasury. Practically, 
these would imply that a loss (gain) on 10-Year Treasury 1 contract would be fully matched 
with the gain (loss) on the 5-Year Treasury 1.6 contracts. The DV01 relationship derived in the 
beginning of the paragraph is the baseline of the hedging ratios, which would be 1:0.625 or 
1.6:1. However, these are not tradable ratios, as it is impossible to buy/sell 1.6 or 0.625 
contracts, i.e. any number that is not an integer. Therefore, the final ratios would be the 
minimum multiple that would keep this relationship, which in this case would be 8:5. The 
difference between the original relationship and the adjusted (tradable) ratios is called the tail, 
and represents usually a small exposure or in other words, a deviation from being fully hedged 
in terms of DV01. 
Conclusions: DV01 is a widely used measure of risk. Its definition itself has several 
interpretations and can be used as a tool to serve different purposes. This section aimed at 
introducing DV01 as a hedging tool. 
As the strategies were not tested in the live market, it is not possible to conclude about its 
efficiency. However, in theory, assuming that DV01 would be the only relevant factor affecting 
the amplitude of the movements of the securities involved which in the example were futures 
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contracts on US Treasuries, the holder of the strategy would reduce her risk by adjusting the 
weight on each contract by its DV01 risk. In reality, hedging is a difficult task and becoming 
fully hedged is barely feasible. First because there are other internal factors affecting the 
markets besides DV01 and there are also external factors and market anomalies that may go 
against the model. Second, the DV01 relationship as the baseline for the ratios is hard to 
maintain when transforming this into a tradable number of contracts. 
4.4.10.  DV01 to Next Call ($ per 100bps yield change) 
 
Valuable to analyze hedge adjustments in case of next call. However, DV01 to Workout 
date could be more valuable. 
Definition: 
DV01($ per 100bps yield change) is the monetary variation in the case of a 100 basis points 
change of interest rate. It is an interest rate risk metric, as it tells how much money the security 
value will change for a percentage point change. It is computed through the following formula: 










Where P is referent to the security price function and r to interest rate. It is necessary to divide 
the dollar duration by 100 (since modified duration is expressed as a 100% change, a unitary 
price movement, and ($ per 100bps yield change) is referring to a percentage point change). 
The metric DV01 to Next Call, is an adjustment of the commonly used DV01, it will refer to 
the monetary variation a security is exposed to, per a percentage point interest rates change, 
assuming that a security’s call option will be exercised in the next callable date. 
As mentioned before, DV01 is very convenient to produce analysis, as it allows hedge strategies 
to be developed (which is not possible using duration, as it delivers a value in percentage terms).  
- 85 - 
 
Interpretation/Results: 
As discussed, structured products are highly exposed to call risk. Consequently, this metric is 
useful as it helps develop hedging strategies, as well as compare the exposition of different 
securities to interest changes in absolute value, in the case the call option is being exercised in 
the next callable date.  
This value can be more accurate than the DV01 to Maturity, depending on the expectations 
about the security life. In the particular case of structured products, we have to remember that 
there are very few products from this market that reach the maturity. Consequently, metrics like 
this are very useful to investors depending on their expectation about the product life. In this 
case, this metric is very interesting if the investors believe the call will be exercised in the next 
possible period, or at least for them to study the implication on the portfolio if this possible 
scenario happens. 
Also, a metric as DV01 to Workout date can be more valuable, as it uses the most probable date 
to an option being exercised, as it is possibly different than the next call date. In case the 
workout date is the next callable date, this suggested metric (DV01 to Workout Date) will also 
incorporate that scenario.  
As mentioned before, we can indirectly reach this metric, through an adaptation of the 
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4.4.11. Convexity to Worst 
 
In our calculation the results were inconclusive. However, it may be valuable to define 
risk calculating models as it corrects the inaccuracies of a linear duration, in the worst 
scenario.   
Definition: 
This metric was developed by us together with Moody´s following their expectations on what 
it should measure, it is something new that is not currently being used in the market or by the 
institution. Convexity, the change in duration to worst when interest rates change by 1%, can 
also be seen as the rate of sensitivity of an asset to interest rates. A bond with greater convexity 
is less affected by interest rate changes than a bond with a lower convexity. Therefore, as the 
price for high convexity bonds is not as easily impacted, these will also have higher prices than 
lower convexity ones (irrespective of a rise or fall in interest rates). Mathematically, it is 
















where P is the bond price, y is the yield and CFt stands for the cash flow at period t. 
Convexity to worst is the convexity given the worst-case scenario. In other words, instead of 
using the yield to maturity of the bond as given, it considers the worst-case scenario yield. 
Using a callable bond as an example, convexity to worst is computed using the lowest between 
the yield to maturity and the yield to call of the bond. (As explained previously, the worst-case 
was determined by assessing which one of the two scenarios – run to maturity or forced call at 
the next callable date – yielded the lower return). 
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Interpretation/Results: 
In the tranches where we could observe changing durations, we could observe some values of 
negative convexity. However, in roughly 90% of the times, the convexity would be equal to 
zero, as the duration would not change with small changes in yield. Considering this, the 
analysis we made on our sample of tranches was inconclusive on this metric, as was its 
importance and relevance for this sample. 
4.4.12. Duration to Worst 
 
Valuable as it returns the sensitivity of the price relatively to interest rates in the worst-
case, but inconclusive results on the analysis. 
Definition: 
This metric was designed by us, especially for Moody’s and it is not currently being used in the 
market or by the institution. Duration by itself is an extremely important measure to consider, 
especially on Fixed Income securities. It is the sensitivity of a security price to a change in the 
level of interest rates, and is calculated as:  
Macauley Duration = ∑ t ∗ wt
T





where the numerator is the present value of the cash flow occurring at time t and P is the bond 
price. It is also commonly calculated as the percentage change in a bond’s price given a 1% 
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Intuitively, one can think of duration as the number of years to receive the price paid for the 
bond when payments are fixed. The same would not be true for floaters, since the coupon resets 
every period. Therefore, this is used as a measure of risk, because the longer the time to 
maturity, as duration also increases with time, the higher the uncertainty and the risk associated. 
Also, a higher duration implies a higher loss on the asset’s price when interest rates rise by 1%.  
If a bond is callable, puttable, or has other exchangeable features, its duration to worst uses the 
lowest of these yields instead of the yield to maturity. Considering the case of a callable bond, 
duration to worst is the percentage change in the bond’s price given the lowest yield between 
its YTM and its yield-to-call, if lower. Mainly, it assumes that bond will or will not be called, 
without allowing for uncertainty, such as changes in the interest rate environment. Considering 
this, duration to worst would be the worst-case scenario of duration for a certain fixed income 
asset. 
Interpretation/Results: 
Having a clear understanding about the definition of this metric, we have conducted the 
simulations on a specified set of tranches provided on the Structured Finance Portal. These 
simulations were applied to two different scenarios; in the first we would consider the YTM, 
and in the second the bond would be called, referring to the yield-to-call; from these scenarios, 
the one with the lower yield is defined as the worst case. In the simulations we would change 
the interest rates by 1 percentage point and observe the effect on both prices. The scenario with 
the highest duration should suffer the biggest change in price.  
An important point that we have considered while analyzing the results is that a callable bond 
may not be desirable by the holder of the asset, because once the bond is called by the issuer, 
its holder stops receiving the cash flows, i.e. the returns. For example, if the economy enters a 
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rate cut cycle, there would be attractive refinancing opportunities due to the lower rates, which 
leads us to the prepayment. At this stage of the economy, borrowers would simply repay their 
debt and refinance it at a lower interest rate. Also, as lower interest rates have a positive impact 
on a fixed income asset, high duration would be desirable at this phase. However, sometimes 
exercising the call in the next possible period could have value to the investor, depending on 
future cash flows and on the call strike. In other words, the impact of a call exercise could be 
beneficial or harmful to investor and issuer: it will depend on whether the option is in or out of 
the money. When testing this metric, we are forcing a call in the next possible date, implying 
that it will be exercised independently of it harming or not the issuer. It is important to 
remember that in a normal and real market situation the issuer will only exercise in the case 
where it creates value to him. 
Considering this, one would expect a lower yield to return a higher duration, because if the 
bond is yielding lower returns, then the repayment of the amount invested on the assets would 
take longer to be received through its cash flows. For example, a higher yield would be implying 
that the bondholder would receive repayment for the security at a higher rate. However, this 
does not apply for most of the cases we have analyzed. First, in roughly 60% of the cases, 
duration would be the same for all the scenarios, which might be explained by the fact that one 
of the scenarios was a forced call on a callable bond happening very close to or at maturity. 
Also, whenever there was a lower duration on one of the scenarios, it was on the callable bond, 
obviously because calling a bond before the maturity dates forcibly reduces the maturity of the 
asset, and thus its duration. 
Duration to worst is relevant but we should interpret the result carefully, since it may return in 
some cases inconclusive results – mainly when there is no difference between duration in 
different scenarios. Additionally, although it has been possible to compute the duration to worst 
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using the Structured Finance Portal, it may be interesting to carry out a more in-depth study on 
a possible extended metric, such as effective duration to worst. Since the analysed products 
have variable cash flows and price, this suggested metric could capture price sensitivity in more 
detail. It is also important to take into account that although duration is easier to calculate and 
understand for investors, convexity can provide more accurate and exact results. 
4.4.13. Return Over Horizon Given Yield Curve Shifts 
 
Valuable because it shows how returns are affected by a change in the yield curve. 
Definition: 
A parallel shift in the yield curve happens when the slope of the curve remains unchanged; that 
is, the interest rates on all maturities (short-term, intermediate, and long-term) move, increasing 
or decreasing, by the same number of basis points. If the slope changes and yields suffer by 
different amounts, the shift is non-parallel. (Kennon, 2016) 
When the yield curve shifts, the price of the bond, which was initially priced based on the initial 
yield curve, will change. If, for example, a bond is maturing in two years and the correspondent 
two-year yield decreases, the bond will increase in price due to this yield curve change.  
If the yield spread between long- and short-term interest rates narrows, the yield curve is said 
to flatten, and the price of the bond will be adjusted. If it steepens, on the other hand, the spread 
between long- and short-term interest rates increases, and prices of longer-term bonds decrease 




- 91 - 
 
Interpretation/Results: 
To assess the impact of the forward curve in practical terms, we considered 6 scenarios of 
parallel shifts, by increasing and decreasing the corresponding forward curve (EURIBOR or 
GBP LIBOR, depending on the deal) by 0.5 percentage points (pp), 1pp, and 2pp.  
Comparing the yield changes for a set price of 100, it can be concluded in general terms that 
when the forward rates increase, so does the yield of the instrument – meaning the 
corresponding “true” market price would drop in price. The opposite happens with a decrease 
in interest rates, but to a lesser degree: the change in the bond’s yield is smaller with a decrease 
compared to an increase of equal magnitude. In fact, there are instances where the magnitude 
of the decrease does not matter, and the yield drops to a certain level and remains the same 
despite it being a decrease of 0.5pp, 1pp or 2pp.  
We also ran this initial scenario against a 2nd scenario with lower prepay rate, and higher default 
and loss rates. There was not a significant difference in the changes in yield (the magnitude and 
behavior of the change was pretty similar across scenarios).  
Even though the yields react in a fairly predictable direction to forward curve changes, the 
actual magnitude varied a lot. There are also exceptions to the rule, such as tranches where the 
yield drops to the exact same level regardless of the magnitude (0.5pp, 1pp or 2pp) or the 
direction (increase or decrease). This metric could therefore be useful to clearly show how 
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4.4.14. Asset Swap Spread 
 
Not valuable: although it can be used to evaluate credit risk, it has assumptions that 
only fit regular bonds. 
Definition: 
An Asset Swap is a package of a Corporate Bond with a fixed coupon and an Interest Rate 
Swap, where the buyer gets the bond and pays to the Asset Swap Seller a fixed rate (equal to 
the coupon on the Bond) while receiving a fixed spread plus a variable component (dependent 
on an index). The Asset Swap Spread on the variable leg is such that the value of the Asset 
Swap package equals the par value of the respective Corporate Bond at the inception of the 
deal. 

















 , c = Coupon Rate, 
r(0;t) = zero coupon swap rate, and P = market price of bond. 
Interpretation/Results: 
The Asset Swap Spread is a measure of credit quality, it reflects the risk in the cash-flows while 
assuming the interest rate risk to be residual. However, since bonds only pay interest until 
maturity and in these specific products we would use the current balance as principal, this 
measure must be recalculated after principal payments. 
 
 




Does not add value and cannot be applied to small cashflows. 
Definition: 
Unlike the Z-spread which is added to the whole risk-free spot rate curve, the Zero-Volatility 
OAS applies to a single interest rate path such that:  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 =
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛
(1+𝑟(0,1))1
+ ⋯ +  
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛
(1+𝑟(0,𝑡)+𝑍𝑉𝑂(𝑡))





Similar to the Z-spread, a higher ZVO should indicate higher risk on the Bond. Moreover, both 
these metrics increase with volatility when we are considering a MBS due to the increase in the 
value of the option embedded along the fact that the MBS holder is going short on the option. 
This metric presents various flaws: first, it cannot be applied to relatively small cash-flows 
(regardless of how high the discount rate is, there is a limit to how much one can discount these 
cash-flows and achieve the market value); second, higher cash-flows and most recent ones are 
prone to have a lower ZVO (hence it does not add value when comparing within the cash-
flows); and finally, the ZVO’s own value in itself is meaningless. 
4.5. Greeks 
 
The Greeks are a set of metrics usually applied to call and put options on stocks. They are 
important to investors holding options because they show how the price of the call or put moves 
when variables related to the underlying change (such as the price of the underlying asset, 
volatility, interest rate, and time to maturity).  
- 94 - 
 
Callable bonds would be the closest equivalent in structured products. Therefore, the metrics 
would have to be adapted to bonds; specifically, it would be necessary to know the formula 
with which the option component would be priced. This is quite tricky regarding the type of 
products we are dealing with: as this kind of structured products are traded OTC, the valuation 
method of the product in itself is habitually undisclosed and varying with several factors, such 
as the lifecycle of the product, and hedging and packaging costs, as described previously. As a 
result, the specific option pricing formula is extremely hard to determine. 
Thus, for our particular project, we were dependent on the specificities of the products and on 
the information available in the portal, so the Greeks were calculated through simulations in the 
portal (none of these metrics are available in the portal yet). Since they were not achieved 
through a specific formula, they might not be as accurate as possible, as they are subject to the 
assumptions of the portal.  
4.5.1. Delta 
 
Valuable to understand how sensitive the call option is to changes in bond price. 
Definition: (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2014; Hull, 2015) 
Delta, usually applied to options on stocks and here applied to callable bonds, compares the 





𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
This metric measures the option’s exposure and sensitivity to changes in the underlying asset’s 
price, and it can be interpreted as the change in option price for a $1 increase in the stock price.  
Assuming a stock option has a delta value of Δ, if the price of the underlying stock increases by 
$1 per share, the option will rise by $Δ per share, ceteris paribus. Having a positive delta means 
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that if the underlying rises, the option/position loses value. Conversely, a negative delta implies 
that if the underlying rises, the option/position gains value.  
Interpretation/Results: 
The delta was lower for the most senior tranches of the deals, and was gradually higher the 
lower the seniority – meaning the more junior the tranche, the higher the exposure and 
sensitivity to changes in the bond price.  
It tended to differ in size between prices, within each tranche. That is, the delta decreases in 
size (ignoring the sign) as the price considered increases, implying the effect on the price of a 
change in value of the underlying would be more pronounced for lower prices, compared to 
higher prices.  
In terms of the sign, delta is usually negative, which correlates with the fact that, from the 
issuer’s perspective, the option loses value as the price increases, as it is more likely to be 
exercised.  
This metric can be important to understand how sensitive the call option is to changes in price, 
for different levels of price. It does seem to follow a predictable path: the call option becomes 
less valuable (even reaching a negative value) as the price of the product is higher, and the 
sensitivity is heightened the more junior the tranche. If made available and calculated properly, 
which could be difficult due to the lack of pricing formulas, it would allow investors to assess 








Could be valuable since it shows the call value sensitivity to changes in volatility, 
however we could not test the metric. 
Definition: (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2014; Hull, 2015) 
Vega measures an option's sensitivity to changes in the volatility of the underlying asset. It 






𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
Vega changes when there are large price movements, resulting in increased volatility, in the 
underlying asset. It is interpreted as the option/position gaining $𝜈 for each percentage-point 
increase in implied volatility, ceteris paribus.  
If the vega value is greater than the bid-ask spread, the options are said to offer a competitive 
spread. As the option gets closer to expiration (and time to maturity decreases), vega is expected 
to fall. In addition, both call and put options should gain value with higher volatility. (Folger, 
2017) 
Interpretation/Results: 
To calculate this metric through simulation, as the remaining Greeks were calculated, the portal 
would need to display the volatility, and allow it to be changed as a user-input. In that case, the 
metric could, in theory, be useful to assess the call sensitivity to changes in volatility, and 
predict its value if times of increased uncertainty and volatility are expected. Still, by being 
calculated through simulations as the other Greeks were, it would be subject to the portal 
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assumptions; for a more solid result, the specific call option formula would be necessary, in 
order to take its derivative. 
4.5.3. Rho 
 
Could be valuable as it gives the sensitivity to changes in interest rate, however it is 
usually the less used of the Greeks because of the small magnitude of the changes. 
Definition: (Hull, 2015) 
Rho measures sensitivity to the interest rate: it is the derivative of the option value with respect 
to the risk-free interest rate. In other words, it is the rate of change in the derivative’s price 





𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
For a rho of 𝜌, for an increase in interest rates of 1 percentage point, the option/position gains 
$𝜌, ceteris paribus.  
Interpretation/Results: 
This metric was calculated by comparing the value of the call option in the current scenario 
with the value in a scenario with a 1 pp increase in the forward curve (parallel shift). The 
difference in value gives us the rho, the change in value for a 1 pp increase in interest rates.  
The results obtained did not seem to follow any specific rule in terms of sign: some tranches 
reacted negatively (positively) to an increase in interest rates, with the call losing (gaining) 
value – for all prices –, while others benefitted for some prices and were negatively affected for 
other prices (for example, having a positive rho for prices below 100 and negative for above). 
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Comparing the results of the tranches within each deal, in one of the cases the tranches reacted 
as the example above – positive rho for prices below 100 and negative otherwise. The other 
deal, with 7 tranches, yielded either all positive or all negative rho’s for the same tranche. 
In terms of seniority, no conclusions could be taken, since some of the junior tranches had lower 
rho’s than the most senior ones. 
A change in interest rates does not usually have a significant impact on option pricing, rendering 
this metric the more overlooked of the ‘Greeks’. Nevertheless, since the two deals considered 
reacted in different and seemingly random ways, and the tranches also behaved in different 
patterns, it could be valuable to have information on this metric, as the movements can be quite 
unpredictable. More solid results could be studied if a call option pricing formula, specific to 
each product, could be discerned.  
4.5.4. Theta 
 
Could be valuable to assess how the call value changes with the passage of time, 
however a specific option pricing formula is essential, so that the fact that these 
products do not usually reach maturity is taken into account. 
Definition: (Hull, 2015) 
Theta measures the sensitivity of the value of the derivative to the passage of time, also referred 
to as the time decay on the value of an option, since all else constant, the option loses value as 





𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
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Time decay leads to a loss in option value as it approaches its expiration date. In theory, for a 
theta of Θ, the option loses Θ per day until it reaches expiration, ceteris paribus. 
Interpretation/Results: 
No conclusions could be taken on the behaviour of theta. There were cases where all thetas 
were negative/positive for all prices, and decreasing with price – meaning the effect on the call 
value was worse for higher prices compared to lower prices; and cases where the effect of one 
less month to maturity was positive for smaller prices but negative for higher ones.  
Therefore, the effect of having time to maturity decrease 1 unit, and being closer to maturity, 
affects the value of the call in very different ways depending on the price considered.  
There was also no discernible pattern relatively to the seniority of the tranches. In terms of 
magnitude, the change in call value was relatively small, with theta denoting values usually 
below 1 pp. 
While we could not take any concluding remarks about this metric, it could be valuable if there 
is interest in assessing how the call value reacts to the passage of time. Nevertheless, it would 
need to be calculated through a specific option valuation formula, as simulations ignore the fact 
that these products usually do not reach maturity and are more likely to be exercised beforehand. 
4.5.5. Gamma 
 
Not valuable because conclusions can be taken from analysing delta; gamma does not 
provide additional insight. 
Definition: (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2014; Hull, 2015) 
Measuring the rate of change in the delta with respect to changes in the underlying price, 
Gamma is the second derivative of the value function with respect to the underlying price. In 
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other words, it is the rate of change in an option's delta per 1-point move in the underlying 
asset's price: 







𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
The gamma of an option indicates the sensitivity of an option's delta in relation to a $1 change 
in the underlying security. Theoretically, it is:  
• “highest when the option gets near the money;  
• positive for long options and negative for short options;  
• smallest for deep out-of-the-money and deep in-the money options.” (Summa, 2014) 
Interpretation/Results: 
While the sign of the changes (positive/negative) did not seem to follow any predictable move, 
despite the theoretical expectation of it being negative for short options, it was always fairly 
constant and close to 0.  
Thus, the value of the delta itself does not change that much following changes in the underlying 
price, and when it does it is in a constant pattern (same increase/decrease across prices). So, the 
sensitivity of the delta to price changes stays fairly the same regardless of the initial price.  
For this reason, it can be argued this metric does not add much value to understanding the 
different tranches within a deal, since the conclusions derived from this metric can be attained 
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5. Regulation Project 
 
5.1. Introduction to Regulation 
 
In this final section of our report, we focus on existing regulation, namely from Bank for 
International Settlements (2016), developed with the purpose of calculating the risk weights 
regulated financial institutions, mainly banks, must consider in order to meet regulatory 
requirements. This subject is quite relevant not only to the regulated institutions, but also to 
investors, since the changes in risk weights may affect them indirectly through the products 
they hold. Moreover, Moody’s portal already offers risk weight calculation, under two 
approaches (SEC-ERBA and SEC-SA), thus changes in regulation will have to be incorporated 
in order to keep providing the best and most updated advice to their customers. 
The Basel Committee was established by the central bank governors of a group of ten countries 
to enhance financial stability, by improving the banking supervision and the enforcement of 
regulation rules, and to serve as the head coordinator for regular cooperation between its 
member countries on banking supervisory matters. Since its jurisdiction, the Basel Committee 
has expanded from the G10 to 45 institutions and has established several international standards 
for banking regulation, the most known being the Basel I, Basel II and the most recently 
published, Basel III. 
Basel I, also called the Basel Capital Accord, was established to respond to a capital adequacy 
need, the main focus of the Committee’s activities in the 1980s. One of the main policies of the 
Accord was setting a minimum capital to risk-weight assets of 8%. An amendment to Basel I, 
established 9 years after its implementation, aimed at incorporating market risks arising from 
banks’ exposure by allowing banks to use internal models, such as VaR models, to measure 
their capital risk requirements, subject to specific requirements, both qualitative and 
quantitative. 
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Basel II, the New Capital Framework, aimed primarily at assessing financial innovation and is 
comprised of three main pillars. The first is the minimum capital requirements, mainly to 
develop and expand the standardised rules set out on the old Basel framework. The second point 
consists on the supervisory review of an institution’s capital adequacy and internal assessment 
process. Finally, the third pillar intends to strengthen market discipline and encourage the sound 
banking practices. 
The most recent Accord, Basel III, was developed to strengthen the Basel II framework as a 
response to the credit crisis of 2008. Concerns relating to dependence in external ratings and 
other gaps from Basel II, that support the 2008 crisis, led to the introduction of new approaches 
and new restrictions to the previous methodology in Basel III. The main policies outlined were 
an additional layer of common equity, a countercyclical capital buffer, a leverage ratio, liquidity 
requirements and additional proposals to target specific financial institutions. 
Since the implementation of Basel III, the requirements of the Basel committee have expanded 
significantly, with the main focus on the risk-weighted assets (RWA), internal ratings and on 
setting regulatory capital floors. These are the base of Basel IV, which will be implemented 
within the next years and will certainly cause serious impact on banks, mainly at a capital level. 
The main goal of the changes to the framework was to enhance risk sensitivity, recalibrate risks 
in more prudent way, improve consistency with the underlying credit risk framework and 
enhance simplicity.  
From a more general view, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has made 
changes to the previous framework regarding some past experiences of implementation and 
essentially to strengthen the capital standards for all participants (originators, sponsors and 
investors) in securitization. The revised framework includes an alternative capital treatment for 
“simple, transparent and comparable” (STC) securitizations. The main goal of STC criteria is 
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to help all involved parties evaluate more thoroughly the risks and returns of a securitization, 
and to enable more straightforward comparisons across securitization products within an asset 
class. These criteria cannot substitute due diligence, although it will be useful for investors in 
undertaking due diligence on securitisations. The STC will help mitigate uncertainty related to 
asset risk, structural risk, governance, and operational risk. 
Among the proposed changes under Basel IV, the most impactful regards the securitisation’s 
exposures calculations, which are used to calculate a bank’s capital requirements. This can be 
done according to three different approaches under Basel III: SEC-ERBA, SEC-IRBA and 
SEC-SA. 
SEC-SA is the only allowed approach for resecuritisations and comes last in the hierarchy of 
the approaches, meant to be used by less sophisticated banks. It should only be chosen as a last 
resort, if none of the other approaches (IRBA and ERBA) can be applied.  
Meanwhile, the IRB approach is the most preferred of the three, better for assessing the risks 
related with the securitisation exposures and thus aimed at more sophisticated banks. This 
relates to internal models developed by the banks, tailored to their specific characteristics, and 
therefore are not public knowledge; however, they are still subject to strict rules and must be 
approved by the supervisory entity. Consequently, the impact of using this approach in 
comparison to the others is not possible to assess as these models are not publically disclosed.  
Both SA and IRBA calculate the risk-weights using SSFA (Simplified Supervisory Formula 
Approach), the difference lies with how the variables (K, D, A and p, which will be described 
in the next sub-chapter) are defined; particularly, the K and p for the IRBA approach are much 
more comprehensive than the SA parameters, since they take into account factors such as Loss 
Given Default, maturity of the tranches and effective number of loans in the pool, which the 
SA approach does not consider.  
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A financial institution that does not have the appropriate data to assign the parameters described 
below, and thus cannot use SEC-IRBA, SEC-ERBA or SEC-SA, must assign the exposure a 
risk weight of 1250%. 
In the next section of our report, we explore the most updated Basel policies that will be 
established under Basel IV, focusing on the Standardized Approach (SA) and External Ratings 
Based Approach (ERBA). 
5.2. SEC-SA Methodology 
 
To calculate capital requirements and the specific risk-weighting factor for a securitisation 
exposure to an SA pool (when the IRB cannot be applied because the bank lacks the approval 
to apply IRB, the bank’s supervisor prohibits it, or the bank simply lacks the data to use IRB) 
using the SEC-SA, a bank must provide accurate information on the following four inputs: 
1.       KSA, the SA capital charge for the underlying exposures using the Standardised Approach 
for credit risk, is the weighted-average capital charge of the entire portfolio of underlying 
exposures. Calculated according to the total capital requirement of the underlying exposure, 
using the risk-weighted asset amounts in the SA in Section II of the Basel framework in relation 
to the sum of the exposure amounts of underlying exposures, multiplied by 8%. It is expressed 
as a decimal between zero and one, such that a weighted-average risk weight of 100% means 
KSA is 0.08. The RWA calculation must take into account the effects of any credit risk mitigant 
applied to the underlying exposures. (Credit risk mitigants can be collateralized transactions, 
on-balance sheet netting agreements, guarantees and credit derivatives. These techniques are 
used in calculating capital requirements). A provision or non-refundable purchase price 
discount on an exposure in the pool is excluded from the calculation, which should consider the 
gross amount of the exposure (without the specific provisions and discounts). 
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2.       W, the delinquency ratio, is the ratio of the sum of the nominal amount of delinquent 
underlying exposures to the nominal amount of underlying exposures. Delinquent underlying 
exposures are underlying exposures that are: 
a.       at least 90 days past due; 
b.       subject to bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings; 
c.       in the process of foreclosure; 
d.       held as real estate owned; 
e.       or in default (default is defined within the securitisation deal documents). 
3.       Input A, the tranche attachment point, is the threshold at which credit losses within the 
underlying pool would first be allocated to the securitisation exposure. It is a decimal value 
between zero and one, and can found as the maximum between zero and the ratio of the 
outstanding balance of all underlying assets in the securitisation minus the outstanding balance 
of all tranches that rank senior or equal to the tranche that contains the securitisation exposure 
of the bank (including the exposure itself), to the outstanding balance of all underlying assets 
in the securitisation. 
4.       Input D, the tranche detachment point, is the threshold at which credit losses, within the 
underlying pool, result in a total loss of principal for the tranche in which a securitisation 
exposure exists. It is also a decimal value between zero and one, and can found as the maximum 
between zero and the ratio of the outstanding balance of all underlying assets in the 
securitisation minus the outstanding balance of all tranches that rank senior to the tranche that 
contains the securitisation exposure of the bank, to the outstanding balance of all underlying 
assets in the securitisation. Thus, parameter D is the parameter A plus the ratio of the current 
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dollar amount of the securitization positions with an equal or higher seniority than the tranche 
with the exposure, to the current dollar amount of the underlying exposures. 
For inputs A and D, overcollateralization and funded reserve accounts are to be recognised as 
tranches; and the assets serving as such reserve accounts are to be recognised as underlying 
assets. Unfunded reserve accounts and assets which do not provide credit enhancement are not 
to be included in the calculations. 
Having defined the aforementioned variables, and knowing that p is defined as  
{
𝑝 = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑆𝑇𝐶 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑝 = 1.5 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑝 = 0.5 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑇𝐶 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
the remaining factors are calculated as follows: 
𝐾𝐴 = (1 − 𝑊) ∙ 𝐾𝑆𝐴 + 𝑊 ∙ 0.5 , if delinquency status is known for all underlying exposures; 
𝐾𝐴 = (
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑊 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛
𝐸𝐴𝐷 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
∙ 𝐾𝐴
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑊 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛) +
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 2 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑊 𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛
𝐸𝐴𝐷 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
 , if 
delinquency status is not known by the bank for no more than 5% of underlying exposures in 
the pool; 𝑢 = 𝐷 − 𝐾𝐴; 𝑎 = −
1
𝑝∙𝐾𝐴




  (capital requirement per unit of the securitisation exposure). 
Finally, Risk Weight is calculated as 𝑅𝑊 = [
𝐾𝐴−𝐴
𝐷−𝐴
∙ 12.5] + [
𝐷−𝐾𝐴
𝐷−𝐴
∙ 12.5 ∙ 𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐴(𝐾𝐴)], if A is 
less than KA and D is greater than KA. If D is lower or equal to KA, the exposure is assigned a 
risk weight of 1250%. If A is higher than or equal to KA, the exposure is calculated as 
𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐴(𝐾𝐴) ∙ 12.5. If the delinquency status is unknown for more than 5% of underlying 
exposures in the pool, the securitisation exposure is risk weighted at 1250%. 
- 107 - 
 
A final note: when a bank applies the SEC-SA approach to an unrated junior exposure, for 
which no rating can be inferred, and the more senior exposures are rated, the risk-weight of the 
junior tranche cannot be lower than the risk-weight for the next more senior rated exposure. 
5.3. SEC-ERBA Methodology 
 
While applying the External Ratings-Based Approach (SEC-ERBA), the risk-weighted assets 
are determined by the product of the securitization exposure (the sum of the on-balance and off-
balance sheet exposure amount) by the appropriate risk weights. In order to be applicable in the 
securitization framework, one should also verify if the operational requirements (defined and 
clarified in appendix 2) are met when using external credit assessments and inferred ratings. 
Moreover, the risk weights to be applied will depend on many factors, such as if we are 
considering short-term or long-term ratings.   
Before the explanation of how the risk weight is calculated, it is crucial to define tranche 
maturity (𝑀𝑇) and how it should be calculated under the Basel’s latest regulation that will be 
incorporated in Basel IV. The tranche maturity is simply the effective maturity that is remaining 
and is expressed in years.  
In order to calculate it, the institution can choose between two possible ways: 
1) As the monetary value (e.g. dollar or euro) weighted-average maturity of the contractual 
remaining cash flows of a tranche, being it calculated using the following formula: 
𝑀𝑇 =
∑ 𝑡 ×  𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑡
∑ 𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑡
 
where 𝐶𝐹𝑡 denoted the cash flows (what is the sum of principal, interest and fees) contractually 
paid in the period t by the borrower. 
2) Based on tranche final legal maturity, using the formula: 
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𝑀𝑇 = 1 + (𝑀𝐿 − 1)  ×  80% 
where 𝑀𝐿 stand for the tranche final legal maturity. 
When the contractual payments are conditional and/or dependent on the actual performance of 
securitised assets the first approach cannot be used (for example ABS); the institution must 
calculate maturity using the final legal maturity method.  
Another relevant point regarding the effective maturity is that it assumes a floor of one year and 
a cap of five years. 
5.3.1. Short-term Ratings 
 
When dealing with short-term exposures, it is only needed the short-term rating or the inferred 
rating, that is based on a short-term rating. Based on the external credit classification, the risk 
weight is given by Table 1 (Appendix). 
5.3.2. Long-term Ratings 
 
For long term-exposures, the risk-weighted calculation depends of more factors than the short-
term one. In the long-term case it is necessary not only to access the external rating grade, but 
also tranche seniority position, tranche maturity (that should be calculated as previously 
explained), and in the case of a non-senior tranches, it is necessary to calculate the tranche 
thickness (T) – which is equal to detachment point (D) minus attachment point (A). 
Regarding the senior tranche, that is the tranche in the higher seniority position, the risk weight 
is given by Table 2 (Appendix), being only dependable of tranche maturity and on the external 
credit assessment directly given or inferred.  
When dealing with non-senior tranches, there are no significant changes. Instead of using the 
table 2 as reference, Table 3 (Appendix) should be used. Using the risk weight from table 3, 
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already adjusted to maturity, and using the tranche thickness, the risk weight should be 
calculated using the following formula:  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = (𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 3  𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)  ×  (1 − min (𝑇; 50%) 
An observation should be made regarding the tranches that do not have a maturity equal to 1 or 
5 years, as in this case the risk weight should be calculated through a linear interpolation. Being 
also important to warn that the effective maturity has a floor of 1 year and a cap of 5 years; 
consequently, different maturities are restrained by these effective maturities limits. For 
instance, an effective maturity of 6 years must follow the 5 years’ rules. 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 𝑋 =  𝑅𝑊𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 1 + ( 𝑋 − 1)  × 
𝑅𝑊  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 5 − 𝑅𝑊  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 1 
5 − 1
 
where X is equal to tranche maturity and RW stands for risk weight. 
5.3.3. ‘Simple, transparent and comparable’ (STC) securitisations 
 
The revised framework includes an alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and 
comparable” (STC) securitizations. The main goal of STC criteria is to help all involved parties 
evaluate more thoroughly the risks and returns of a securitization, and to allow more 
straightforward comparisons across securitization products within an asset class. These criteria 
cannot substitute due diligence, although it will be useful for investors in undertaking due 
diligence on securitisations. The STC will help mitigate uncertainty related to asset risk, 
structural risk, governance, and operational risk. 
Simplicity relates to the fact that there should be homogeneity of underlying assets, with simple 
characteristics, and a transaction structure should not be overly complex.  
The main purpose of Transparency is to provide enough information on the underlying assets, 
the structure of the transaction and the parties involved in the transaction, thereby promoting a 
more comprehensive and thorough understanding of the risks involved.  
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Comparability should support investors in understanding investments and allow more 
straightforward comparison across securitisation products within an asset class. It is important 
to take into account differences across jurisdictions.  
Whenever a securitisation transaction is assessed as STC-compliant, it should be subject to 
different capital treatments under the ERBA. Firstly, the new floor for risk weights is 10% for 
senior tranches and 15% for non-senior ones. For short-term ratings, the risk weights are applied 
as according to Table 4 (Appendix). In the case of long-term securitisation, the weights are 
divided between senior and non-senior tranches, being the weights restrained by the floor of 1 
year and the cap of 5, and it is necessary to compute an interpolation to get the adequate weight 
to use. The tables to compute the correct weights are Table 5, for senior tranches, and Table 6 
for non-senior tranches. 
5.4. Results and Interpretation 
 
In order to compare the External Rating Based Approach (ERBA) to the Securitisation 
Standardised Approach (SEC-SA), we were given by Moody’s Analytics a portfolio consisting 
of 35 tranches (22 RMBSs, 8 ABSs and 5 Auto loans) to run both approaches using the SF 
Portal. After confirming if the assumptions regarding the risk weights were consistent with 
Basel III, we found out that the SF Portal not only did not consider all the tranches (only 29 
were considered), but also attributed higher risk weights using the ERBA approach, compared 
to SEC-SA, for 22 out of the 29 tranches. Moreover, ERBA’s risk weights reached higher levels 
more often, giving the highest possible value (1250%) 5 times, while the highest value under 
the SEC-SA was 607.33%. 
These results are surprising, since the ERBA is higher in the hierarchy of approaches, hence is 
more restrictive and is based in more detailed information than the SA. Therefore, it should 
require lower capital requirements for financial institutions. Under these circumstances, we may 
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be under the presence of a Moral Hazard cost, since the institutions will prefer a less demanding 






















As this report demonstrates, there are several points that are not fully clear and might be 
improved as the market becomes more efficient. The market for structured finance products, 
the main focus of this report, is still growing and becoming more popular every day. However, 
there are still some aspects that made our analysis more difficult.  
First, as for structured finance products the market is not transparent, the lack of information 
makes it extremely hard to predict the prices and the respective maturities of the securities. The 
tools provided by Moody’s Analytics were developed to facilitate the analysis for these complex 
products. Still, in several metrics we would need to assume a scenario or a set of different 
scenarios to compute the value of the metric. It is true that the Portal has made this step easier 
by providing more information than is available from public sources, but we still found the task 
very abstract, in the sense that the outcome would be highly dependent on the assumptions 
made for the scenario. One example that represents this is the Yield to Workout date (“What 
should be the workout date?”) and the Yield-to-Call (“When will the bond be called?”). Having 
these as inputs, the results will be strongly influenced by the assumption values, or in these 
cases dates. Adding to this, it is hard to find existing tools, which in our case for the metrics 
would be predicting models for this type of products to solve these problems. The CPR 
Estimation: Richard and Roll (1989) model developed in this report is one example of these 
predicting models. 
Secondly, the metrics that are currently being used to analyse structured products are not 
complete and could be more efficient in capturing and measuring the risk/results. On the 
different projects, we have analysed several tranches from a wide range of deals, and while 
applying the metrics to the structured products, we had to assume some inputs, as were the cases 
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of the CPR and/or CDR level, based on historical data rather than on forward looking models, 
such as the Richard and Roll (1989) model, suggested previously.    
Finally, regulation has been changing and is consistently improving over time to better capture 
the risks implied in every security, and to increase transparency. An example would be the 
increase in the requirements of the different approaches described on the report, and the STC 
(simple, transparent and comparable) criteria that was developed to guarantee the credibility 
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Appendix 1: Failure of the Yield to Workout date 
In this equation we are assuming we bought the product at 100, the initial balance is 100, the 
scheduled prepayment is 30 per year and the coupon payment is 5 % in the first year, 6% in 
the second and 7% in the third period. We are also assuming the call will be exercised when 
there is remaining 10 % from the original balance.  
𝑃 = 100 =
30 + 5
(1 + 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)1
+
30 + 4,2
(1 + 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)2
+
30 + 2,8
(1 + 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)3
+
10
(1 + 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)3
 
In this case we would have a maturity of 3 years and a yield of around 5,7%. If we know let the 
model take into consideration the market conditions, for instance an interest rate decrease that 
would imply a CPR of 30% we would get a different cash-flows distribution: 
𝑃 = 100 =
30 + 5 + 21
(1 + 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 )1
+
30 + 2,94 + 12





Now taking into consideration the impact of market changes on cash-flows distribution we 
would have a maturity of 2 years and a yield of around 5,3%. 
As it possible to see in the example this metric could lead investors to wrong inferences and 
consequently to wrong capital allocations, by taking into account the prepayment the security 
life reduces one year and the yield decrease 0,4%, in a real life situation this could have serial 
implications has the investor to reach the 3-year maturity will have to incur in transaction costs 
again and at the time the available product may not delivered return high enough to compensate. 
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Appendix 2: SEC-ERBA Operational Requirements  
The appropriate risk weights will be dependent on if the following operational requirements 
regarding the use of external credit assessments or for inferred rating (these originate when 
there is an unrated exposure that is senior to another exposure, this one being rated, within the 
same transaction) are met.    
Use of external credit assessments1:  
• The external credit assessment must consider and reflect the entire amount of credit 
risk exposure the bank has regarding all payments owed to it; 
• The external credit assessment must be from an eligible external credit assessment 
institution (ECAI), recognised by the respective national supervisor in accordance 
with the Basel II framework. To be classified as an ECAI, an institution must meet six 
requirements: 
o Objectivity (the assessment methodology is rigorous and validated) 
o Independence (the ECAI’s ratings are not influenced by any kind of political 
or economic pressures) 
o International access/transparency (the assessments are available equally to 
domestic and foreign entities) 
o Disclosure (information on assessment methodologies should be disclosed, 
particularly the default definition and rates, time horizon, transition matrix, and 
meaning of each rating) 
o Resources (which should be enough to enable credit assessments to be made 
with the highest quality) 
o Credibility (measured for example regarding the reliance on the credit 
assessments by other independent parties, such as investors and insurers) 
                                                          
1 From paragraph 71 of Basel III Document - Revisions to the securitisation framework 
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• The ECAI must have demonstrated expertise in assessing securitisations; 
• If at least two eligible ECAI assess differently the same exposure, one should apply 
paragraphs 96 to 98 of the Basel II framework. Therefore, in case more than one 
ECAIs assessments are chosen by a bank and they lead to different risk weights: 
o If there are two different risk weights’ assessments, the higher one must be 
chosen; 
o If there are three or more, the higher of the two lowest risk weights’ 
assessments must be chosen. 
• In the case there is credit risk mitigation (CRM) provided by an eligible guarantor 
(according to the paragraph 195 in Basel II), the risk weight should be the one 
calculated according to the respective external credit assessment (so referring to tables 
1, 2 and 3). If the guarantor is not eligible, it should be treated as unrated; 
• When the credit risk mitigant solely protects a specific securitisation exposure within 
a given structure (so if, for example, only part of a tranche is protected by a CRM 
mechanism) and this partial protection was considered in the external credit 
assessment thus influencing the categorization of the whole structure (i.e. tranche), the 
bank must treat the exposure as if it is unrated. (Note: In our opinion, an insurance 
from an external entity is not necessarily what this point is referring to, instead it is 
referring to internal measures from the bank, such as portfolio diversification and other 
credit risk mitigation measures that can be taken by an institution trying to ensure 
payments are always guaranteed); 
• If an external credit assessment is at least partly based on unfunded support provided 
by the bank, it cannot use external credit assessment for risk weighting purposes.  
Basically, a bank cannot use external credit assessment when it has provided unfunded 
securitisation exposure to an institution. It is necessary to remember that the exposure 
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given by the bank has impact on the credit assessment of the institution. As a result, 
the bank must treat that institution as not rated and so hold capital against the provided 
securitisation exposure.    
Inferred Ratings (as explained before, these originate when there is an unrated exposure that is 
senior to another exposure, this one being rated, within the same transaction)2: 
• Reference securitisation exposure and the unrated securitisation exposure should be 
similar in all respects.  
• The maturity of the reference securitisation exposure must be at least as long as the 
unrated exposure. 
• On an ongoing basis, any inferred rating must be updated continuously to reflect any 
subordination of the unrated position or changes in the external rating of the reference 
securitisation exposure. 
• The external rating of the reference securitisation exposure must satisfy the general 
requirements for recognition of external ratings as delineated before. 





All other ratings 
Risk weight 15% 50% 100% 1250% 
 





Tranche maturity (𝑀𝑇) 
1 year 5 years 
Aaa 15% 20% 
Aa1 15% 30% 
Aa2 25% 40% 
Aa3 30% 45% 
                                                          
2 From paragraph 73 of Basel III Document - Revisions to the securitisation framework 
 
3 The ratings used are short-term ratings, being P classification is given by Moody´s, while A classification is 
used by S&P.  
4 The rating grades here exposed are only the Moody´s ones, however this is only illustrative. 
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A1 40% 50% 
A2 50% 65% 
A3 60% 70% 
Baa1 75% 90% 
Baa2 90% 105% 
Baa3 120% 140% 
Ba1 140% 160% 
Ba2 160% 180% 
Ba3 200% 225% 
B1 250% 280% 
B2 310% 340% 
B3 380% 420% 
Caa1 / Caa2 / Caa3 460% 505% 
Bellow  Caa3 1250% 1250% 
 





Tranche maturity (𝑀𝑇) 
1 year 5 years 
Aaa 15% 70% 
Aa1 15% 90% 
Aa2 30% 120% 
Aa3 40% 140% 
A1 60% 160% 
A2 80% 180% 
A3 120% 210% 
Baa1 170% 260% 
Baa2 220% 310% 
Baa3 330% 420% 
Ba1 470% 580% 
Ba2 620% 760% 
Ba3 750% 860% 
B1 900% 950% 
B2 1050% 1050% 
B3 1130% 1130% 
Caa1 / Caa2 / Caa3 1250% 1250% 
Bellow  Caa3 1250% 1250% 
 
Table 4: ERBA risk weight for short-term exposures for STC securitisation 
External credit assessment P-1/A-1 P-2/A-2 P-3/A-
3 
All other ratings 
Risk weight 10% 30% 60% 1250% 
                                                          
5 The rating grades here exposed are only the Moody´s ones, however this is only illustrative. 
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Tranche maturity (𝑀𝑇) 
1 year 5 years 
Aaa 10% 10% 
Aa1 10% 15% 
Aa2 15% 20% 
Aa3 15% 25% 
A1 20% 30% 
A2 30% 40% 
A3 35% 40% 
Baa1 45% 55% 
Baa2 55% 65% 
Baa3 70% 85% 
Ba1 120% 135% 
Ba2 135% 155% 
Ba3 170% 195% 
B1 225% 250% 
B2 280% 305% 
B3 340% 380% 
Caa1 / Caa2 / Caa3 415% 455% 
Bellow  Caa3 1250% 1250% 
 







Tranche maturity (𝑀𝑇) 
1 year 5 years 
Aaa 15% 40% 
Aa1 15% 55% 
Aa2 15% 70% 
Aa3 25% 80% 
A1 35% 95% 
A2 60% 135% 
A3 95% 170% 
Baa1 150% 225% 
Baa2 180% 255% 
Baa3 270% 345% 
Ba1 405% 500% 
Ba2 535% 655% 
Ba3 645% 740% 
B1 810% 855% 
B2 945% 945% 
B3 1015% 1015% 
Caa1 / Caa2 / Caa3 1250% 1250% 
Bellow Caa3 1250% 1250% 
 
